An Integrated Framework for Improving the Quality and Reliability of Software Upgrades by Crameri, Olivier
POUR L'OBTENTION DU GRADE DE DOCTEUR ÈS SCIENCES
acceptée sur proposition du jury:
Prof. A. Wegmann, président du jury
Prof. W. Zwaenepoel, directeur de thèse
Prof. R. Bianchini, rapporteur 
Dr C. Cadar, rapporteur 
Prof. D. Kostic, rapporteur 
An Integrated Framework for Improving the Quality and 
Reliability of Software Upgrades
THÈSE NO 5087 (2011)
ÉCOLE POLYTECHNIQUE FÉDÉRALE DE LAUSANNE
PRÉSENTÉE LE 24 jUIN 2011
À LA FACULTÉ INFORMATIQUE ET COMMUNICATIONS
LABORATOIRE DE SYSTÈMES D'EXPLOITATION
PROGRAMME DOCTORAL EN INFORMATIQUE, COMMUNICATIONS ET INFORMATION
Suisse
2011
PAR
Olivier CRAMERI

Abstract
Despite major advances in the engineering of maintain-
able and robust software over the years, upgrading software
remains a primitive and error-prone activity. In this disser-
tation, we argue that several problems with upgrading soft-
ware are caused by a poor integration between upgrade de-
ployment, testing, and problem reporting. To support this
argument, we present a characterization of software upgrades
resulting from a survey we conducted of 50 system adminis-
trators. Motivated by the survey results, we present Mirage,
a distributed framework for integrating upgrade deployment,
testing, and problem reporting into the overall upgrade de-
velopment process.
Mirage’s deployment subsystem allows the vendor to de-
ploy its upgrades in stages over clusters of users sharing simi-
lar environments. Staged deployment incorporates testing of
the upgrade on the users’ machines. It is effective in allowing
the vendor to detect problems early and limit the dissemina-
tion of buggy upgrades.
Oasis, the testing subsystem of Mirage, improves on cur-
rent state-of-the-art concolic and symbolic engines by imple-
menting a new heuristic to prioritize the exploration of new
or affected code in the upgrade. Furthermore, interactive
symbolic execution, a new approach exposing the problem of
path exploration to the tester using a graphical user inter-
face, can be used to develop new search heuristics or manu-
ally guide testing to important areas of the source code.
In spite of all of these efforts, some bugs are bound to
remain in the software when it is deployed, and will be dis-
covered and reported only later by the users. With the last
component of Mirage, we consider the problem of instru-
menting programs to reproduce bugs effectively, while keep-
ing user data private. In particular, we develop static and
dynamic analysis techniques to minimize the amount of in-
strumentation, and therefore the overhead incurred by the
users, while considerably speeding up debugging.
By combining up-front testing, stage deployment, testing
on user machines, and efficient reporting, Mirage successfully
reduces the number of problems, minimizes the number of
users affected, and shortens the time needed to fix remaining
problems.
Keywords: Upgrade testing, Clustering of machines,
Staged software upgrade deployment, Testing, Regression
testing, Debugging, Bug Reporting, Symbolic Execution, Static
Analysis
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Re´sume´
Malgre´ d’importantes avance´es dans l’inge´nierie de logi-
ciels robustes ces dernie`res anne´es, mettre a` jour un logi-
ciel reste une activite´ primitive et sujette a` de nombreux
proble`mes. Dans cette the`se, nous pre´tendons que de nom-
breux proble`mes de mise a` jour sont cause´s par une mau-
vaise inte´gration entre le de´ploiement, le test et le rapport
de proble`mes.
Pour supporter cet argument, nous pre´sentons une cara-
cte´risation des mises a` jour de logiciel obtenue a` travers un
sondage de cinquante administrateurs syste`me. Sur la base
des re´sultats du sondage, nous pre´sentons Mirage, un syste`me
distribue´ inte´grant le de´ploiement, le test et le rapport de
proble`mes dans le processus de de´veloppement de mises a`
jour.
Le sous-syste`me de de´ploiement de Mirage permet au
vendeur de de´ployer ses mises a` jour par e´tapes re´parties sur
des groupes d’utilisateurs partageant des caracte´ristiques de
leur environnement. Le de´ploiement par e´tapes incorpore le
test des mises a` jour sur les machines appartenant aux utilisa-
teurs. C’est une me´thode efficace pour de´tecter les proble`mes
rapidement et limiter la propagation de ces derniers a` de
nombreux utilisateurs.
Oasis, le sous-syste`me de test de Mirage, ame´liore l’e´tat
de l’art dans les moteurs d’exe´cution symbolique en met-
tant en oeuvre une nouvelle heuristique d’exploration du
nouveau code, ou du code affecte´ par la mise a` jour. De
plus, l’exe´cution symbolique interactive, une nouvelle tech-
nique qui expose le proble`me de l’exploration des chemins au
testeur via une interface graphique, peut eˆtre utilise´e pour
de´velopper de nouvelles heuristiques de recherche ou pour
manuellement diriger le test vers des re´gions du code source
importantes.
Malgre´ tous ces efforts, certains proble`mes persisteront
toujours dans les logiciels de´ploye´s, et seront de´couverts et
rapporte´s plus tard par les utilisateurs. Avec le dernier com-
posant de Mirage, nous e´tudions le proble`me de l’instrumen-
tation de programmes pour permettre une reproduction facile
des proble`mes, sans compromettre la confidentialite´ des do-
nne´es. En particulier, nous de´veloppons de nouvelles me´tho-
des d’analyse statique et dynamique permettant de minimiser
la quantite´ d’instrumentation ne´cessaire, et par conse´quent
la surcharge impose´e aux utilisateurs, tout en acce´le´rant con-
side´rablement le de´boguage de proble`mes.
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En combinant le test, le de´ploiement par e´tapes, le test
sur les machines d’utilisateurs, et un syste`me de rapport de
proble`mes efficace, Mirage re´duit significativement le nombre
de proble`mes, l’exposition des utilisateurs a` ces derniers, et
raccourcit le temps ne´cessaire pour de´boguer les proble`mes
restants.
Mots-cle´s: Test de mises a` jour, Classification de ma-
chines, De´ploiement de mises a` jour par e´tapes, Test, Test de
re´gression, De´boguage, Rapport de bogues, Execution sym-
bolique, Analyse statique
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Software upgrades involve acquiring a new version of an application,
an improved software module or component, or simply a “patch” to
fix a bug, and integrating it into the local system. Upgrades for
Linux and Windows are released almost every month, while up-
grades of user-level utilities and applications are frequent as well.
For software users, system administrators, and operators (here-
after collectively called users, for conciseness), integrating upgrades
is often an involved proposition. First, an upgrade can affect multi-
ple applications, and all of them may need to be tested for correct
behavior after the upgrade. Second, the effects of buggy upgrades
may need to be rolled back. Third, upgrades are prone to a variety of
incompatibility and unexpected behavior problems, especially when
components or modules, rather than entire applications or systems,
are upgraded.
For software vendors, distributors, and open-source contributors
(hereafter collectively called vendors, for conciseness), it is difficult
to deploy the upgrades with high confidence that they will integrate
properly into the users’ systems and that they will behave as users
expect. Recent significant advances in testing, such as symbolic exe-
cution, can improve the quality of the software upgrade. They suffer
however from severe scalability problems and are not tailored to re-
gression testing of software upgrades. For these reasons, vendors
simply cannot anticipate and test their upgrades for all the appli-
cations and configurations that may be affected by the upgrades
at the users’ machines. To lessen this problem, vendors sometimes
rely on “beta testing”. However, beta testers seldom provide com-
plete coverage of the environments and uses to which upgrades will
be exposed. Another approach to reduce integration problems is
for vendors to use package-management systems to deploy their up-
grades. Dependency enforcement in these systems, however, only
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tries to enforce that the right packages are in place. They do not
provide any help with locally testing the upgrades for correct be-
havior or reporting problems back to vendors.
When problems occur, vendors receive only limited and often un-
structured information to pinpoint and correct the problems. Most
of the time, the vendor at best receives core dumps of applications
that crash because of the upgrade or often incomplete problem re-
ports posted to mailing lists or Web forums. Because of this limited
information, it may take several iterations of deployment, testing,
and debugging before an upgrade becomes useful to all of its in-
tended users. Furthermore, because reports may come from any
source, e.g., multiple beta testers or regular users with similar in-
stallations, there is often much repetition in the information received
by the vendor, requiring significant human resources to filter out.
Although much anecdotal evidence suggests a high frequency of
upgrade problems, there is surprisingly little information in the lit-
erature characterizing upgrades in detail. To start bridging this gap
in the literature, we perform a characterization of upgrades, using
responses to a survey that we conduct among 50 system adminis-
trators. The results confirm that upgrades are done frequently, that
problems are quite common, that these problems can cause severe
disruption and that therefore upgrades are often delayed, and that
users seldom fully report the problems to the vendor. Addition-
ally, many of the problems are caused by differences between the
environment at the vendor and at the users. Broken dependencies,
incompatibilities with legacy applications, and improper packaging
issues are among this class of problems.
In this dissertation, we argue that the problems plaguing soft-
ware upgrades are fundamental. To improve the quality of upgrades,
and reduce the impact of problems, it is therefore necessary to re-
vise the entire software upgrade life cycle. To this end, we present
Mirage, a framework that integrates upgrade deployment, testing,
and problem reporting. Figure 1.1 shows a high level overview of
the components of Mirage. In the current state of the art, these
three activities are loosely linked in an ad-hoc manner. Mirage in-
tegrates them into a structured and efficient upgrade development
cycle that encompasses both vendors and users. Mirage tests up-
grades before deployment using state of the art concolic execution.
Then, it deploys complex upgrades in stages based on the cluster-
ing of the user machines according to their environments. It tests
the upgrades again at the users’ machines, and sends information
back to vendors regarding the success/failure of each user’s upgrade.
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Figure 1.1: High-level overview of Mirage
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In case of failure, whether during staged deployment or later, Mi-
rage sends back a trace of branches simplifying reproduction of the
problem. This trace is obtained using lightweight instrumentation
to minimize the instrumentation overhead and only collect infor-
mation that is determinant in helping the vendor reproducing the
problem. By combining up-front testing, staged deployment, test-
ing on user machines, and efficient reporting, Mirage successfully
reduces the number of problems, minimizes the number of users
affected, and shortens the time needed to fix remaining problems.
A key goal of Mirage is to guarantee that upgrades behave prop-
erly before they are widely deployed. Clustering machines as in
Mirage helps achieve this goal, while simplifying debugging at the
vendor. We also identify a fundamental trade-off between the num-
ber of upgrade problems at the user machines and the speed of
deployment. To address this trade-off, Mirage provides a few ab-
stractions on top of which different staged deployment protocols can
be implemented.
In addition to staged deployment, Mirage provides a testing fa-
cility and a bug reporting system. Both components make extensive
use of symbolic execution as well as dynamic and static analysis. We
have designed and implemented Oasis, a state-of-the-art concolic ex-
ecution engine (a variation of symbolic execution) specifically built
to support user-machine testing and bug reporting in Mirage.
For testing, Oasis improves on state-of-the-art symbolic execu-
tion by implementing techniques to focus the testing on areas of the
code affected by the changes in the upgrade. Our first technique is
a new search heuristic that identifies the changes in the upgrade. It
then uses a control-flow graph to direct the testing of the code to ar-
eas that have been modified. During each execution of the program,
the heuristic tracks the effect of the changed code on the old code
and subsequently strives to test the affected code more intensively.
Our second technique is interactive symbolic execution, a new ap-
proach that exposes the problem of path explosion to the tester
through a graphical user interface. This interface allows the tester
to better understand the bottlenecks in trying to cover interesting
parts of the code, and is therefore very useful in developing new
search heuristics. Interactive symbolic execution can also be used
to manually influence the exploration of the code by interfering with
the scheduling of new paths to be explored.
Finally, to improve over the ad-hoc reporting seen in the sur-
vey, Mirage provides a structured reporting facility, which can use
different combinations of static analysis and symbolic execution to
4
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balance the trade-off between instrumentation overhead and debug-
ging time. It allows users to report problems by sending the vendor
a partial branch trace. This trace allows the vendor to easily repro-
duce the problem, therefore significantly speeding up debugging.
Overview of the results
We evaluate Mirage’s clustering algorithm with respect to real up-
grades and problems reported in our survey. The results demon-
strate that our algorithm can cluster the users’ machines effectively.
Our algorithm works best when used in combination with vendor-
provided information about the importance of certain aspects of the
application’s environment. Further, our simulations show that de-
ploying upgrades in stages significantly reduces the amount of test-
ing effort required of the users, while quickly deploying the upgrade
at a large fraction of machines. Although we occasionally delay de-
ploying certain upgrades, by increasing the users’ confidence, they
may actually apply the upgrades sooner.
The testing component of Mirage, Oasis, is evaluated using an
open source web server. We show that our heuristic targeting new or
affected code is able to test the upgrade much more intensively with-
out sacrificing code coverage. Our preliminary experiments with
interactive symbolic execution allowed us to better understand the
progression of the heuristic and identify key areas where improve-
ments are needed.
For bug reporting, we study the trade-off between instrumenta-
tion overhead and debugging time using an open-source Web server,
the diff utility, and four coreutils programs. Our results shows that
using a combination of dynamic and static analysis, our system is
capable of limiting both the overhead of branch logging and the bug
reproduction time. We conclude that our techniques represent an
important step in improving bug reporting and making symbolic
execution more practical for bug reproduction.
Contributions
At a high level, the main contributions of this thesis are the follow-
ing:
1. The characterization of software upgrade problems using a
survey of fifty system administrators.
2. The design, implementation and evaluation of Mirage, a frame-
work that integrates deployment, user machine testing and
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bug reporting into a structured and efficient upgrade develop-
ment cycle that encompasses both vendors and users.
3. The design, implementation and evaluation of Oasis, a state-
of-the-art concolic execution engine. Oasis supports regression
testing of software upgrades through a directed search heuris-
tic and a new technique called interactive symbolic execution.
4. The study of the trade-off between instrumentation overhead
and debugging time for bug reporting using different tech-
niques including symbolic execution, dynamic and static anal-
ysis.
We detail each of the contributions in the corresponding chapters
of the dissertation.
Organisation of the dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2
presents the results of a survey characterizing upgrade problems.
Chapter 3 describes our technique for staging upgrade deployment
in order to reduce the impact of problems. Chapter 4 describes
our implementation of Oasis, a state-of-the-art concolic engine and
its application to regression testing. Chapter 5 describes our bug
reporting technique using static and dynamic analysis to balance
the trade-off between debugging time and instrumentation overhead.
Chapter 6 presents the related works. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes
the dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Characterizing Upgrades
2.1 Methodology
We conducted an online survey to estimate the frequency of software
upgrades, the reasons for the upgrades, the frequency of software
upgrade problems, the classes of problems that occur, and the fre-
quency of the different classes. We posted the survey (reproduced
in appendix A) to the USENIX SAGE mailing list, the Swiss net-
work operators group, and the EliteSecurity forum in Serbia. We
received 50 responses.
The majority of the respondents to our survey (82%) have more
than five years of administration experience, and 78% manage more
than 20 machines. Our respondents were allowed to specify mul-
tiple, non-disjoint choices of operating systems, making it difficult
to correlate upgrade problems with an operating system version.
In our survey, 48 of the administrators manage a Linux system or
some other UNIX-like system, 29 administrators manage Windows
desktops and server platforms, while 12 respondents manage Mac
OS machines.
2.2 Survey Results
Frequency of Software Upgrades
As Figure 2.1 demonstrates, upgrades are frequent. Specifically,
90% of administrators perform upgrades once a month or more of-
ten.
Reasons for Upgrades
We asked respondents to rank (from 1 to 5, 1 being most impor-
tant) each of five possible reasons: 1) bug fix, 2) security patch,
7
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Figure 2.1: Upgrade frequencies.
3) new feature, 4) user request, and 5) other reason. Security fixes
get the highest priority (average rank 1.6), followed by bug fixes
(average rank 2.2) with user requests and new features trailing (av-
erage ranks of 3.3 and 3.5, respectively). Given that the primary
reason for performing an upgrade is a security fix, it can be harmful
if administrators delay upgrading.
Upgrade Installation Delays
Nevertheless, 70% of our respondents report that they refrain from
installing a software upgrade, regardless of their experience level.
This is the case even though 70% of administrators have an upgrade
testing strategy (Figure 2.2 shows these results). An overwhelming
majority (86%) of administrators use the software packaged with
the operating system to install upgrades.
Upgrade Failure Frequency
We asked respondents to estimate this rate. As Figure 2.3 shows,
66% of them estimate that between 5 and 10% of the upgrades
that are applied have problems. Given the potential damage and
extra effort that a faulty upgrade can entail (discussed next), such
a failure rate is unacceptable. Over all the responses, the average
failure rate is 8.6% and the median is 5%.
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Figure 2.2: Reluctance to upgrade.
Another reason for avoiding upgrades may be the damage that
a faulty upgrade can cause. An important fraction of the admin-
istrators (48%) experience problems that pass initial testing, with
18% reporting catastrophic upgrade failures.
Testing Strategies
The majority of the testing strategies our respondents use involve
having a testing environment (25 respondents). Six of the adminis-
trators report testing the upgrade on a few machines, then moving
on to a larger fraction, before finally applying the upgrade to the
entire machine set. However, only 4 respondents use an identical
machine configuration in the testing environment. Two of the re-
spondents rely on reports of successful upgrades on the Internet
without an additional testing strategy. Although 70% of the re-
spondents have an upgrade testing strategy, only 18% of the admin-
istrators report that they do not have upgrade problems because
they use it.
Causes of Failed Upgrades
We asked the administrators to assign a rank to each of the failure
categories that we provided, including an optional “other categories”
field. Our respondents identified broken dependencies, removed be-
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Figure 2.3: Perceived upgrade failure rate.
havior, and buggy upgrades as the most prevalent causes (average
ranks of 2.5, 2.5 and 2.6, respectively). They deemed incompati-
bility with legacy configurations and improper packaging to be less
common (average ranks of 3.1 and 3.2, respectively). We detail some
of the reported problems in Section 2.3. Here we conclude that no
single cause of upgrade failure is dominant.
Problem Reporting
Only half of the respondents consistently report upgrade problems
to the vendor. When they do so, the information they typically
include is the versions of the operating system and related software,
type of hardware, and any error messages.
2.3 Categories of Upgrade Problems
Here we describe the major categories of upgrade problems (in de-
creasing order of importance assigned by respondents) and a few
examples. We combined the reported problems with some that we
found on Web forums.
10
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Broken Dependency
This category captures subtle dependency issues that often cause
severe disruption. Typically, application AX is compiled with a
specific library LY or depends on some application AY . Upgrad-
ing some other application AZ that depends on LY (or AY ) can
upgrade LY (or AY ) as well, causing application AX to fail. For
example, when upgrading the MySQL DBMS from version 4 to 5,
the PHP scripting language crashes if it was compiled with MySQL
support [41]. PHP still tries to use libraries from the old version.
Some of these broken dependency issues could be caught by the
package management system. However, package-management sys-
tems cannot catch these issues if the administrator upgrades some
files manually.
Important Feature was Removed, or Behavior was
Altered
A significant number of upgrade problems is caused by the removal
of an important feature of the software. A related problem is altered
behavior of an application or a changed API. An example of this
category is an upgrade of PHP4 to PHP5 that caused some scripts
(.php pages) to stop working due to a new Object Model [48]. The
problems in this category cannot be alleviated by improved packag-
ing, as it becomes almost impossible to search and upgrade all cases
of deprecated behavior across all user files.
Buggy Upgrades
A natural category of the failed upgrades captures the bugs in the
upgrade itself. For example, Firefox crashes when displaying some
Web pages with JavaScript on Ubuntu, after the 1.5.0.9 upgrade is
applied [21]. Some of the problematic upgrades our survey respon-
dents reported have serious consequences, such as wireless, RAID,
and other driver upgrades that caused the system to fail to boot.
Incompatibility with Legacy Configurations
Another category of upgrades involves machine-specific data that
causes an upgraded application to fail. This kind of data includes
environment variables and configuration files. For example, the up-
grade of Apache from 1.3.24 to 1.3.26 caused Apache configurations
that included an access control list to fail [2]. The contents of the in-
cluded file had to be moved to the main configuration file for Apache
11
Discussion
to start working again. Again it is difficult for upgrade packaging
to handle all possible configurations at user machines.
Improper Packaging
This category of upgrade problems occurs when the creator of the
new package (that contains the upgrade) does not correctly upgrade
all application components. Typically, this includes an omission
of some application file, as it was the case with SlimServer 6.5.1.
Here, the database was not automatically upgraded during the up-
grade process, and the server consequently would not start due to a
changed database format. Issues like this one can be addressed by
a more careful packaging procedure.
Minor Problems
The final category comprises problems that are not obvious bugs but
represent an annoyance. Often, the problem arises when a cached
file is overwritten instead of upgraded. Some of these seemingly
minor problems can have serious consequences. For example, one
administrator was unable to log into the Zertificon application due
to an administrator password that was overwritten.
2.4 Discussion
We did not seek to perform a comprehensive, statistically rigorous
survey of upgrade management in the field. Our main goals were
to motivate Mirage, while collecting a sampling of data on real up-
grades and their problems. These restricted goals allowed to focus
on a group of administrators, mostly from USENIX SAGE, that vol-
unteered information about their practical experiences. Admittedly,
this approach may have been affected by self-selection, bias, and
coverage problems. Nevertheless, our survey does provide plenty of
information on real upgrades and is broader than the few compara-
ble works in the literature [5, 50], which focused solely on security
upgrades and have their own limitations. In fact, these other works
confirm some of our observations: Beattie et al. [5] state that the
initial security upgrade failure rate is even higher than that reported
by our respondents for all upgrades. An inspection of 350,000 ma-
chines by Secunia [50] finds 28% of all major applications to be
lacking the latest security upgrades, which is in line with the high
fraction of our respondents who delay upgrades.
12
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Staged Deployment and
Clustering
3.1 Introduction
Many approaches are available to reduce the burden of upgrades.
For instance, improved development and testing methods at the
vendor may reduce the number of buggy upgrades. As can be seen,
however, from the results of the survey, several of the frequently
occurring categories of upgrade problems are due to differences be-
tween the development and testing environment at the vendor and
the many different environments at user machines. Broken depen-
dencies and incompatibility with legacy configurations clearly fall
into this category, whereas improper packaging may also result from
environmental differences.
The goal of the Mirage project is to reduce the upgrade problems
associated with such environmental differences between vendors and
users. To do so, the Mirage framework provides three components
that cooperate in a structured manner: staged deployment, testing,
and problem reporting (see Figure 1.1). This chapter describes in
details the staged deployment and clustering component of Mirage.
It assumes that users are able to test upgrades before installing them
and report success or failure. The next chapter describes a system
capable of fulfilling this task automatically.
To correct problems with environmental differences between ven-
dor and users, an upgrade would need to be tested in all possible user
environments. In-house vendor testing of all possible user environ-
ments is infeasible, because the vendor cannot possibly anticipate
all possible uses and environments. Exhaustive testing techniques
such as symbolic execution may help, however they currently do
not scale to real life software, and are unlikely to in the foreseeable
13
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future. Indiscriminate testing at all user sites is also undesirable,
because the problematic upgrades may inconvenience a large num-
ber of users. The current practice of beta-testers tries to reduce this
inconvenience, but provides only limited coverage.
To address these issues, Mirage provides staged deployment.
Machines are clustered based on their environments such that ma-
chines in the same cluster are likely to behave the same with re-
spect to an upgrade. Within clusters, one or a few machines (called
representatives) test the upgrades first, before other machines are
allowed to download and test the upgrade. Finally, staged deploy-
ment allows control over the order in which upgrades are deployed
to clusters.
With staged deployment, the vendor does not need to anticipate
all possible user environments, but at the same time indiscriminate
user-machine testing is avoided. With clustering, the representa-
tives can provide better coverage than current beta-testing. As the
survey shows, users are typically willing to wait to install upgrades,
so the extra delay potentially introduced by staging is acceptable,
especially in light of the reduction in inconvenience.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2
presents the design and implementation of our clustering and staged
deployment techniques. Section 3.3 discusses the current limita-
tions. Section 3.4 evaluates our clustering algorithm in the context
of realistic upgrade problems, and analyzes the performance of two
staged deployment protocols using a simulator. Finally, section 3.5
concludes the paper.
3.2 Design and Implementation
Mirage provides a small number of abstractions to support staged
deployment. Upon these basic abstractions, vendors can build dif-
ferent deployment protocols to reach different objectives. Objec-
tives may include reducing upgrade overhead (which we define as
the number of machines that test a faulty upgrade), reducing up-
grade latency (the delay between the upgrade being available at
the vendor and it being applied at the user), reducing the number
of redundant problem reports, front-loading the problem debugging
effort, or combinations thereof.
Abstractions
The three basic deployment abstractions provided by Mirage are:
clusters of deployment, representatives, and distance between ven-
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dor and clusters. (1) User machines are clustered into groups that
are likely to behave similarly with respect to upgrades of a partic-
ular application. (2) Each cluster has at least one representative
machine. The representative tests the upgrade before any of the
non-representative machines in its cluster do, playing a role simi-
lar to today’s beta-testers. (3) In addition, a measure of distance
may be defined between the vendor and a cluster, indicating the
degree of difference between the vendor’s environment and that of
the machines in the cluster. Intuitively, if a machine is more dis-
similar from the vendor’s machine, the likelihood of a problem with
the upgrade is higher. The vendor can take this additional informa-
tion into account in guiding the deployment protocol. These three
abstractions, and in particular the underlying clustering algorithm,
are the main focus of this chapter.
Clustering is done per application, but has to be evaluated in
the context of a particular upgrade. The quality of the clustering
is critical for many of the potential vendor objectives. For exam-
ple, the upgrade overhead is directly related to the quality of the
clustering. To see this relationship, consider the following types of
clustering assuming that user-machine testing detects an upgrade
problem if and only if there is one.
In an ideal clustering, all machines in a cluster behave identi-
cally with respect to an upgrade and differently from machines in
other clusters. If the upgrade behaves correctly at one machine in
a cluster, it behaves correctly at all machines in that cluster. Fur-
ther, all machines at which the upgrade behave correctly are in the
same cluster. If the upgrade exhibits a problem, it exhibits that
same problem everywhere in the cluster. Moreover, all machines
that exhibit that problem are in the same cluster. If other machines
exhibit a different problem, they are in a different cluster. Thus,
upgrade overhead is limited to the number of representatives, which
is minimal, as is the number of reports sent to the upgrade result
repository.
While ideal, this form of clustering is difficult to achieve in prac-
tice. For this reason, we consider the following slightly less ambi-
tious goal. In a sound clustering, all machines in a cluster behave
identically with respect to an upgrade, as with ideal clustering, but
there may be multiple clusters with the same behavior. In other
words, multiple clusters may exhibit correct behavior or the same
incorrect behavior. The upgrade overhead is no longer minimal,
but as long as the the number of clusters with problems remains
small relative to the total number of machines, there is considerable
15
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improvement.
Clustering becomes considerably worse, if machines within the
same cluster behave differently with respect to an upgrade. In this
imperfect clustering, if an upgrade problem does not manifest itself
at the representative, non-representa-tives are bothered with testing
incorrect upgrades. This problem can be marginally improved by
having a few rather than one representative. If the upgrade fails at
the representative but works correctly at some other machines, then
upgrades to those machines are needlessly delayed.
Protocols
Using these basic abstractions and a particular clustering algorithm,
the vendor may implement different deployment protocols to opti-
mize different criteria. In terms of structure, a protocol is defined by
the degree of deployment parallelism it embodies and, when certain
phases are sequential, the particular sequential orders it imposes.
In any staged deployment protocol, the upgrade is tested on the
representative(s) of a cluster before it goes to non-representatives of
that cluster. That constraint leaves open many variations in terms
of parallelism and ordering.
A vendor may wait for all representatives of all clusters to suc-
cessfully test an upgrade before it sends it to any non-representatives.
Within this basic paradigm, it can send the upgrade in parallel to
all or some representatives or sequentially one at the time to each of
them. The same applies applies to the non-representatives: the up-
grade may be sent to all or some clusters in parallel, or sequentially
to one at a time.
An alternative approach is for the vendor to send the upgrade to
the non-representatives of a cluster as soon as testing finishes suc-
cessfully on the representatives of that cluster. This approach again
leaves open the choice of sending the upgrades to the representatives
of a cluster sequentially or in parallel.
When deployment should proceed one cluster after the other, the
protocol needs to define the exact ordering of cluster deployments.
To support this ordering, the vendor can use Mirage’s distance met-
ric. Going from smaller to larger distances may reduce the average
upgrade latency, whereas going in the inverse order may allow the
vendor to front-load its problem debugging effort.
Different upgrades may be treated differently. In fact, the ven-
dor’s objective for each upgrade typically depends on the charac-
teristics of the upgrade. If the upgrade is a major new release, the
vendor may decide to go slowly. If the upgrade is urgent and the
16
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Figure 3.1: Mirage deployment: clusters of machines, cluster represen-
tatives and non-representatives, and cluster ordering. Some interactions
of a deployment protocol are also shown.
vendor has high confidence in its correctness, it may bypass the en-
tire cluster infrastructure, and distribute the upgrade to all users
at once. Figure 3.1 depicts the key Mirage deployment abstractions
and a few interactions of a generic deployment protocol.
Mirage does not advocate any specific protocol. In Section 3.4 we
evaluate two specific protocols to illustrate some of the possibilities,
but many other variations exist.
Clustering Machines
For upgrade deployment, Mirage seeks to cluster together user ma-
chines that are likely to behave similarly with respect to an upgrade.
Since many of the most common upgrade problems result from dif-
ferences in environment at the vendor and at the user machine,
Mirage clusters machines with similar environments. Thus, before
clustering, Mirage needs to identify the environmental resources on
which the application to be upgraded depends. These resources typ-
ically include the operating system, various runtime libraries, exe-
cutables, environment variables, and configuration files that each
application uses (the environmental resources on a Windows-based
system would include the registry as well).
Next, we detail the steps taken to collect and fingerprint (derive
a compact representation) the set of environmental resources. After
that, we describe our clustering algorithm.
Identifying Environmental Resources
We instrument, both at the vendor and at the user machines, the
process creation, read, write, file descriptor-related and socket-related
system calls. For environment variables, we intercept calls to the
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getenv() function in libc. Using this instrumentation, we create
a log of all external resources accessed. This log may include data
files in addition to environmental resources. Clustering becomes
ineffective if data files are considered as environmental resources.
We use a four-part heuristic to identify environmental resources
among the files accessed by the application in a collection of traces,
combined with an API that allows the vendor to explicitly include
or exclude sets of files. The heuristic identifies as environmental
resources: (1) all files accessed in the longest common prefix of the
sequence of files accessed in the traces, (2) all files accessed read-only
in all execution traces, (3) all files of certain types (such as libraries)
accessed in any single trace, and (4) all files named in the package of
the application to be upgraded. In our current implementation, we
concentrate on files and environment variables. We plan to address
machine hardware properties, network protocols, and other aspects
of the environment in our future work.
The first part of the heuristic is based on the observation that
the execution of applications typically starts with a single-threaded
initialization phase in which the application loads libraries, reads
configuration files and environment variables, etc. Most often, no
data files are read in this initialization phase, and hence all files
accessed in this phase are considered environmental resources. To
find the end of the initialization phase, we compute the longest
common sequence of files from the beginning that are accessed in
every trace.
The second and third parts of the heuristic deal with applications
that access environmental resources after the initialization phase,
for example, applications that use late binding or load extensions
at runtime. To identify those environmental resources, our heuristic
considers all files opened read-only after the initialization sequence.
To separate environmental resources from read-only data files, we
only classify as environmental resources those files that are opened
in every execution or those files that are of a few vendor-specified
types, such as libraries.
The final part of our heuristic includes all files bundled in the
package of the application to be upgraded.
The heuristic may erroneously designate certain files as environ-
mental resources. For instance, the initialization phase may access
a log or some initial data files, or sample data files may also be
included in a package. Conversely, certain environmental resources
are accessed in read-write mode and therefore not included by the
heuristics, typically because the files contain both (mutable) data
18
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and configuration information. To address these issues, a simple
API provided by Mirage allows the vendor to include or exclude
files or directories. By default, we exclude some system-wide direc-
tories, such as /tmp and /var.
As we show in Section 3.4, our heuristic combined with a very
small number of vendor-provided API directives allows Mirage to
correctly identify the environmental resources of popular applica-
tions with no false positives and no false negatives.
Resource Fingerprinting
To produce inputs to the clustering algorithm, we need a concise
representation (a fingerprint) for each environmental resource at
the vendor and at the user machines. Depending on its type, we
have three different ways of fingerprinting a resource. First, for
common types such as libraries, Mirage provides a parser that pro-
duces the fingerprint. Second, the vendor may provide parsers for
certain application-specific resources, like configuration files. Third,
if neither Mirage nor the vendor provides a parser for a resource,
the fingerprint is a sequence of hashes of chunks of the file that are
content-delineated using Rabin fingerprinting. In general, we ex-
pect that for many applications the vast majority of the resources
are handled by parsers, and we resort to Rabin fingerprinting only
in rare circumstances.
A resource’s fingerprint contains a hierarchical set of keys and
their values (items for short). The items produced by the parsers
have a common structure but a meaning that is dependent on the
resource type. Each parser is responsible for determining the granu-
larity of the items that are produced. Indeed, producing fine-grained
items might be useful for some types of resources (such as configura-
tion files) and useless for others (such as executables). In addition,
some resources may contain user-specific data (such as user names
and IP addresses) and other information (such as comments) that
are irrelevant in clustering machines; it is up to each parser to ex-
tract the useful information from the resource and discard the rest.
The parsers for the most common resource types produce items
in the following formats:
• Executables: Executablename.FILE HASH
• Shared libraries: LibraryName.Version#.HASH
• Text files: Filename.Line#.LINE HASH
• Config files: Filename.SectionName.KEY.HASH
• Binary files: Filename.CHUNK HASH
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In contrast, the content-based fingerprinting creates items of
the form: Filename.CHUNK HASH. Clearly, these fingerprints are
more coarsely grained than what is possible with parsers. In fact,
using this method, all the irrelevant data contained in the environ-
mental resources are fingerprinted together with the relevant infor-
mation. We leverage the publicly available Rabin fingerprint imple-
mentation [39], and use the default 4 KB average chunk size.
Once the vendor produces its list of items for the environmental
resources on the reference machine, it sends it to the user machines.
Each user machine compares the list of items from the vendor to its
own list and produces a new list with the set of items that differ from
those of the vendor. The new list contains both items present on
the reference machine but not on the user machine and vice-versa.
This new list is sent back to the vendor, triggering the clustering
algorithm.
Clustering Algorithm
The algorithm is divided into two phases. In the first phase, clus-
tering is performed with respect to the resources for which there
are parsers. Because for these resources we have precise informa-
tion about the relevant aspects of the environment, two machines
are assigned to the same cluster if and only if their sets of items
that differ from the vendor are the same. We refer to the clusters
produced in this first phase as “original clusters”.
In the second phase, the environmental resources for which the
vendor does not provide a parser are taken into account. In this
phase, we need to decide whether to split the original clusters based
on these resources. Since content-based fingerprints do not lever-
age semantic information about the resources, they are imprecise
representations of the resources’ contents. To cope with this im-
precision, we use a diameter-based algorithm that is a variation of
the QT (Quality Threshold) clustering algorithm [30] (we dismissed
the traditional k-means algorithm because it is non-deterministic)
on each of the original clusters.
Considering the user machines of only one original cluster at
a time, the diameter-based algorithm starts with one machine per
cluster. It then iteratively adds machines to clusters while trying
to achieve the smallest average inter-machine distance, without ex-
ceeding the vendor-defined cluster diameter d. The distance metric
is the Manhattan distance between two machines, defined as the
number of different items associated with the resources for which
there are no parsers. When the algorithm cannot merge any addi-
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tional clusters, it moves on to the next original cluster. After the
final set of clusters is produced, we also explicitly split clusters that
contain machines with different sets of applications with overlap-
ping environmental resources. The final clusters are labeled with
their set of differing items.
Discussion
At this point, it should be clear that it is advantageous for the
vendor to provide parsers for as many environmental resources as
possible. Doing so allows the vendor to cluster machines more ac-
curately. In addition, using parsers, the vendor can exercise greater
control over the clustering process. For example, the vendor can
specify which items it believes to be less important. The vendor
can create bigger clusters by removing those items from the set of
differing items of each machine. It is also possible to discard only a
suffix of some of the hierarchical items. For example, assume that
many machines have version 2.4 of libc, but a significant portion
of them have a different library hash. This discrepancy probably
means that there are machines that have version 2.4 of libc com-
piled with different flags. In deploying a non-critical upgrade to the
graphical interface of Firefox, the vendor might decide to discard
this information, thus putting all machines using version 2.4 of libc
in one bigger cluster.
Relative to performance and scalability, the user-side fingerprint-
ing and comparison processes are efficient and distributed, regard-
less of how many parsers are provided. However, producing as many
parsers as possible has advantages in terms of the vendor’s compu-
tational effort. The first phase of the clustering algorithm runs effi-
ciently in time that is proportional to the number of user machines.
In contrast, the second phase performs a number of comparisons
that is quadratic in the number of machines in each original clus-
ter, and each comparison takes time proportional to the number of
items associated with resources for which there are no parsers. Thus,
the second phase can become computationally intensive if there are
many such resources. The running time of the QT algorithm is also
quadratic in the number of machines in each original cluster. In our
future work, we plan to develop an efficient incremental reclustering
approach, since a relevant change in a machine’s environment can
change that machine’s cluster.
21
Discussion and Current Limitations
3.3 Discussion and Current Limitations
Although the presentation above focuses on vendors and individ-
ual users, Mirage can benefit the administrators of large systems as
well. In fact, a large system with uniform machine configurations
is represented as a single machine in Mirage’s deployment proto-
col. Even when system administrators are required to certify all
upgrades manually before deploying them, Mirage can help them
by keeping track of the applications that need to be tested, auto-
matically testing each of them, and reporting unexpected behavior.
Furthermore, by increasing the administrators’ confidence in the up-
grades, Mirage encourages administrators to apply upgrades sooner.
In addition, by automating the reporting of failed upgrades, Mirage
makes it easier for vendors to fix the problems with their upgrades.
Despite its many potential benefits, the current implementation
of Mirage has some limitations.
The information that the vendor stores about the similarities
between the user machines could be used by an attacker to quickly
identify the targets of a known vulnerability. Although items con-
tain hashes of the environmental resources’ contents, the file names
are currently stored in the clear. Computing a cryptographic hash
of file names would not help, as the attacker could install the appli-
cation and check for identical hashes of vulnerable files. However,
we could enhance the security and privacy of our “original”, parser-
aided clustering, by letting each machine determine the cluster it
belongs to locally based just on the comparison with the vendor’s
set of files and fingerprints and by communicating a single crypto-
graphic hash of its items to the vendor. To enable staging, the ven-
dor could transmit only the list of clusters’ hashes to each machine.
If necessary, machines could use some of the anonymity-preserving
techniques [13] to communicate with the vendor. During deploy-
ment, the vendor could publicly advertise the cluster being tested
currently and use only the number of nodes that belong to each
cluster to determine when it is appropriate to move to the next
stage.
3.4 Evaluation
We address the following three questions:
1. Can we accurately identify the environmental resources on
which an application depends?
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firefox 907 839 1 23 7
apache 400 251 133 0 2
php 215 206 0 0 0
mysql 286 250 0 33 1
Table 3.1: Effectiveness of the heuristic in identifying environmental
resources.
2. Can we cluster machines into meaningful clusters such that
members of a cluster behave similarly or identically with re-
spect to an upgrade?
3. Can we use staged deployment to significantly reduce upgrade
overhead with little or no impact on deployment latency?
Identifying Environmental Resources
We study a desktop application (Firefox) and three server applica-
tions (Apache, PHP, and MySQL). To determine false positives (files
the heuristic erroneously flags as environmental resources) and false
negatives (environmental resources the heuristic missed), we man-
ually inspect the set of files produced by the heuristic, as well as
their contents.
Table 3.1 shows, for each application, the number of files ac-
cessed in the traces, the number of environmental resources, the
number of false positives and false negatives generated by the heuris-
tic, and the number of vendor-specified rules necessary to obtain a
perfect classification of the files.
The heuristic by itself is able to correctly classify a large frac-
tion of the environmental resources. Combining the heuristic with
a small number of vendor-specified rules correctly identifies all en-
vironmental resources, without false positives or false negatives.
For PHP, the heuristic correctly identifies all environmental re-
sources, without false positives or false negatives.
For Apache, the heuristic erroneously classifies the access log and
some HTML files from the root document directory as environmen-
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tal resources – the log because it is accessed during initialization,
and the HTML files because they are accessed read-only in each
run.
For MySQL, the heuristic erroneously omitted the directory in
which the mysql database is stored, because by default it excludes
files from /var. These files, however, also contain configuration data
and are part of the environmental resources of MySQL.
For Firefox, not all extension, theme, and font files are included
properly by the heuristic, because Firefox loads them whenever they
are needed (i.e., after the initialization phase). We had to specify
the important file types so they are correctly classified.
As can be seen from the table, the number of files misclassified
can vary significantly from one application to the other. The num-
ber of rules, however, stays very small because each of these rules
recognizes one special case of misclassification under which a vari-
able number of files may fall. For this reason, the number of rules
required to obtain a perfect classification gives a better appreciation
of the effectiveness of the heuristic in terms of its ability to classify
files automatically.
Defining the rules is an easy matter of invoking the regular
expression-based Mirage API. In general, however, some files and
directories are located at different places on different machines. In
this case, the vendor can easily provide a script to automatically
extract the correct location of files and directories from relevant
configuration files or environment variables and generate the regu-
lar expressions locally on each machine.
Clustering
As mentioned in Section 3.2, a clustering is evaluated relative to a
particular upgrade and a set of problems. We start by introducing
metrics that quantify the “goodness” of clustering. The first metric
captures the number of unnecessarily created clusters (C), while the
second metric captures the number of wrongly-placed machines (w),
i.e., machines that behave differently than the rest of their clusters.
If there are p different problems, an ideal clustering creates p+1
clusters (a cluster for every problem, and a cluster containing all
other machines), has no unnecessary clusters (C = 0), and has no
misplaced machines (w = 0). A sound clustering has C ≥ 0 and
w = 0. With a sound clustering, therefore, multiple clusters may
exhibit correct behavior or the same incorrect behavior. A clustering
that is imperfect has w > 0 and potentially C > 0.
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Figure 3.2: Clustering obtained by using parsers for all environmental
resources. Entries in boldface experience the PHP problem with a MySQL
upgrade, whereas entries in bold-italics will exhibit the my.cnf problem.
Unfortunately, an ideal clustering is typically not achievable in
practice. Since a particular problem may affect only a subset of
environments, there may be multiple clusters with machines that
do not experience the problem. In contrast, sound clustering is
achievable and useful in limiting the upgrade overhead, so it is the
type of clustering that we seek to obtain.
We have reproduced a number of machine environments that
exhibit real, non-trivial upgrade problems with two applications:
MySQL and Firefox.
MySQL
Table 3.2 describes the machine configurations used in the MySQL
experiment. On some of these configurations, the upgrade to a
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Figure 3.3: Clustering obtained by using only parsers supplied by Mirage
and a diameter value of 3 for the remaining environmental resources.
Entries in boldface experience the PHP problem, whereas entries in bold-
italics will exhibit the my.cnf problem.
new version is successful. Other configurations (the ones with php4
in their names) are known to exhibit broken-dependency problems
with PHP [41] after a MySQL upgrade. Still others (the ones with
userconfig in their name) exhibit legacy-configuration problems with
the my.cnf MySQL configuration file.
Figure 3.2 shows the results of our clustering algorithm when we
use application-specific parsers for all environmental resources. En-
tries in boldface denote machines that experience the PHP problem
when upgrading MySQL, whereas the entries in bold-italics denote
machines that experience the my.cnf problem.
As we see from Figure 3.2, the machines that experience the
MySQL upgrade problems are not clustered together with machines
experiencing other problems or machines behaving correctly, thus
satisfying our main clustering goal (w = 0). During deployment,
problems would be observed in only two clusters.
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The results also show that the algorithm creates separate clusters
for the different distributions, versions of libc, dependent applica-
tions, and differences in the configuration files. Although these dif-
ferences have no bearing on the behavior of this particular upgrade,
another upgrade could be problematic in one of these different en-
vironments. Thus, the algorithm must conservatively cluster these
machines separately. Overall, this clustering created 12 additional
clusters (C = 12) with respect to this upgrade.
We now examine the results of the clustering algorithm without
using any MySQL-specific parsers; the initial phase of the algorithm
relies on Mirage-supplied parsers only. As described in Section 3.2,
the Mirage-supplied parsers deal with executables, shared libraries,
and system-wide configuration files. Therefore, we have to exe-
cute the second phase of the clustering algorithm, which uses the
QT algorithm for the resources that are fingerprinted with content-
delineation. We show the final clustering results obtained with a
diameter value of 3 in Figure 3.3.
The figure shows that, even without the application-specific par-
sers, our clustering algorithm correctly clusters the machines with
the PHP-related problem. However, we see that clusters 4 and 6
both contain a machine that experiences a problem along with ma-
chines that do not. This clustering is thus not sound (w = 2) for an
upgrade that triggers the my.cnf problem. This happens because
the number of differences between the machines in this cluster is
smaller than the diameter value. Specifically, the differences in this
case are in the hash of the my.cnf file. Since the file is rather small
and our Rabin fingerprinting takes hashes at the granularity of 4KB,
only one hash is different. Using a diameter value of 0 would have
separated the machines in this cluster, but it would also have sep-
arated machines that have benign differences (the machines with
-comment in the name). In a real-world scenario with thousands of
machines, this choice of the diameter could result in a large number
of clusters that would slow down the deployment. This example
shows that picking an adequate diameter value is difficult and that
clustering might be imperfect, regardless of the diameter value cho-
sen, when some parsers are missing.
The vendor can decide to vary the size of the resulting clusters
depending on the upgrade that is to be deployed. For instance,
in our setup we have 5 different types of changes to the MySQL
configuration file my.cnf. If the vendor is providing a parser for this
file and wants to deploy an upgrade that is unlikely to be affected
by any of those changes, it can choose to ignore the corresponding
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Figure 3.4: Firefox clustering obtained by using parsers for all environ-
mental resources. Entries in boldface experience problems when upgrad-
ing to version 2.0.
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Figure 3.5: Firefox clustering results obtained by using only Mirage-
supplied parsers. On the left, results with a diameter value of 4. On the
right, results with a diameter value of 6. Entries in boldface experience
problems when upgrading to version 2.0.
items. The resulting merge of clusters 4,5,6 and clusters 9,10,11 in
Figure 3.2 can speed up the staged deployment. This regrouping of
clusters still correctly separates the problematic configurations from
other, “good” clusters. Such an effect cannot easily be achieved if
the vendor does not provide a parser. Without a parser, creating
larger clusters can only be done by increasing the diameter, which
does not give any guarantee over how machines are going to be
re-clustered.
Firefox
Table 3.3 describes the machine configurations used in the Firefox
experiment. The three first configurations are fresh installations
of version 1.5.0.7 of Firefox, with the third one having Java and
JavaScript disabled. The other three configurations have been up-
graded from version 1.0.4, and the last one has Java and JavaScript
turned off. The latter three configurations exhibit a legacy-
configuration problem when upgraded to Firefox 2.0. In particular,
two preference files that existed in version 1.0.x (and were upgraded
to 1.5.x) cause erratic behavior when Firefox is upgraded to version
2.0 [20].
Figure 3.4 shows results obtained using application-specific par-
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sers for Firefox’s configuration files, in addition to Mirage’s supplied
parsers. The clustering is sound (w = 0, C = 2) for this upgrade;
there are two extra clusters with the two machines with Java and
JavaScript disabled.
Figure 3.5 shows two clustering results using only Miragesupplied
parsers. On the left, a diameter value of 4 is used. The problematic
configurations are all in one cluster, and all the other ones in an-
other cluster. For the upgrade we are considering, this clustering is
ideal, with w = 0 and C = 0. On the right, a diameter value of 6 is
used. This clustering is imperfect, as the problematic configurations
are clustered with other machines (w = 3). These results show that
picking the right clustering diameter is difficult and that a small
difference potentially has a non-trivial impact.
The comparison between the clustering results in Figures 3.4
and 3.5(left) might suggest that it is sometimes better for the vendor
not to provide parsers for its applications. However, this conclusion
is incorrect. The reason is that, when the vendor is about to de-
ploy an upgrade, it does not know if or where problems may occur.
Thus, it would be improper to assume, as done in Figure 3.5(left),
that machines with features turned off always behave the same as
their counterparts with those features turned on. Firefox’s configu-
ration files contain many irrelevant parameters (such as timestamps
and window coordinates) as well as relevant configuration settings
(such as Java settings). Since diameter clustering only considers the
number of differences, it is unable to make a distinction between rel-
evant and irrelevant differences. If the vendor supplies the required
parsers, it can discard the irrelevant differences to guarantee sound
clustering.
Deployment Protocols
We still need to evaluate the impact of staged deployment on up-
grade overhead and latency. Toward this end, out of the space of
possible staged deployment protocols described in Section 3.2, in
this section we evaluate two: one that seeks to front-load most of
the vendor’s debugging effort while reducing the upgrade overhead
(i.e., the number of machines testing a faulty upgrade); and one
that seeks to reduce upgrade overhead without disregarding the up-
grade latency (i.e., the time elapsed until the upgrade is successfully
applied and running on a machine). For both protocols, we assume
that the representatives are always online and ready to fully test
an upgrade, perhaps as a result of a financial arrangement with the
vendor.
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Front-loading the debugging effort while reducing the
upgrade overhead.
The first protocol (called FrontLoading, for short) is divided into two
phases. In the first phase, the vendor starts by notifying all repre-
sentatives of all clusters in parallel that an upgrade is available. The
representatives then download and test the upgrade using Mirage’s
user-machine testing subsystem (or another appropriate testing ap-
proach). Any problems during this phase are reported back to the
vendor using Mirage’s reporting subsystem. Once the problems are
fixed by the vendor, all representatives are again concurrently noti-
fied about the corrected upgrade and can download, test, and report
on it. This process is repeated until no more problems are reported
by the representatives, ending the first phase of the protocol. No
non-representatives test before the end of this phase.
During the second phase, the vendor proceeds by handling one
cluster at a time, sequentially, starting from the cluster that is most
dissimilar to the vendor’s environment and proceeding (in reverse
order of similarity) toward the cluster that is most similar to it.
Ideally, no new problem should be discovered in this phase. How-
ever, because of imperfect testing or clustering, some problems may
still be encountered. The vendor starts this phase by simultane-
ously notifying the non-representative machines of the first cluster
in the order. The non-representatives of this cluster then down-
load the upgrade, test it, and report their results. It is possible
that the upgrade succeeds at some non-representative machines but
fail at others. When this occurs, the non-representative machines
that passed testing are allowed to integrate the upgrade, but are
later notified of a new upgrade fixing the problems with the origi-
nal upgrade. The machines that failed testing do not integrate the
upgrade and are later notified of a (hopefully) corrected version of
the upgrade. When there are no more failures and a large fraction
(according to a vendor-defined threshold) of the non-representatives
have passed upgrade testing successfully, the process is repeated for
the next cluster in the order. The reason we only wait for a (large)
fraction of the non-representative machines to report success is that
some machines may stay oﬄine for long periods of time; it would
be impractical to wait for all these machines to pass testing be-
fore moving to the next cluster. When these “late arrivals” come
back online, they are notified, download, test, and report on all the
upgrades they missed.
This protocol front-loads the debugging effort in two ways: (1)
it collects reports from all representatives of all clusters right from
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the start, getting a broad picture of all the problems that can be
expected; and (2) in its second phase, it proceeds in the reverse
order of cluster distance from the vendor, as farther clusters are
more likely to experience problems. These two characteristics also
allow the protocol to reduce the upgrade overhead.
Reducing upgrade overhead with better upgrade latency.
In our second staged protocol (called Balanced, for short), deploy-
ment starts with the cluster that most closely resembles the ven-
dor’s installation, progresses sequentially to the next cluster that
most closely resembles the vendor, and so on. The similarity be-
tween clusters and the vendor is evaluated by a distance function
accounting for the number of differences in the environmental re-
sources of machines belonging to the clusters. Each time the pro-
tocol progresses to a new cluster, the representatives of that cluster
are notified about it in parallel and can then download, test, and re-
port on it. This process is repeated until the upgrade passes testing
successfully at all the representatives of the cluster. At this point,
the non-representative machines of the cluster are notified and go
through the same process. As in FrontLoading, non-representatives
that pass testing successfully can integrate the upgrade, but may
later receive a new upgrade. When all (or a significant fraction
of) the machines in a cluster have successfully tested an upgrade,
deployment progresses to the next cluster.
This protocol promotes low upgrade overhead by testing up-
grades at the representatives of each cluster before allowing the
much larger number of non-representatives to test them. Interest-
ingly, it also promotes low latency for a large set of machines, as
compared to our first protocol, in two ways: (1) by allowing many
non-representatives to successfully pass testing before problems with
all clusters are debugged by the vendor; and (2) by ordering clus-
ters so that clusters that are more likely to pass testing receive the
upgrades first. However, debugging at the vendor is more spread
out in time, as compared to the first protocol.
Evaluation Methodology
The evaluation is based on an event-driven simulator of different
deployment protocols and clustering schemes. The main simulator
inputs are the number of clusters, the clusters’ sizes, the clustering
quality, the number of representatives per cluster, in which clusters
the upgrade problems appear, and the times to download, test, and
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fix an upgrade. Because our goal here is not to present an exten-
sive set of results for a large number of simulator inputs, we select
a particular scenario and discuss the corresponding results. The
behaviors that we observe with this example scenario are represen-
tative of those of the other scenarios we considered.
Our example scenario has 100,000 simulated machines running
Mirage. The times to download and test an upgrade are 5 and 10
time units, respectively. The time to fix each upgrade problem at
the vendor is set at 500 time units. We choose the ratio between
upgrade download and test vs. debugging time to mimic the ratio
between the expected times in the field; download and test taking
a few tens of minutes, with debugging (entire cycle at the vendor)
taking at least one day. In all cases, we cluster machines into 20
clusters.
We consider two main categories of upgrade problems: prevalent
(a large number of machines are affected by the problem) and non-
prevalent (a smaller number of similar machines are affected). The
results we show are for a case of one prevalent problem affecting
15% of machines (resembling the upgrade failure results reported in
the literature [5]) and two non-prevalent problems in two different
clusters.
We use two different clusterings. The first is sound with re-
spect to the problems we defined; it has 16 more clusters than ideal
clustering, with no misplaced machines. We create the second, im-
perfect, clustering by injecting a single misplaced machine in one of
the clusters from the sound clustering setup. This machine is not a
representative in the affected cluster. We assume that user-machine
testing correctly identifies a problem if there is one, with no false
positives. Hence, we assign one representative per cluster.
Given the lack of large-scale machine characterizations that we
would require in this scenario, we assume that all clusters have the
same size and study per-cluster, rather than per-machine, upgrade
latencies. In the cases we consider, the vast majority of machines
behave the same within a cluster. Hence, this setup enables us to
discuss the qualitative features of our staged deployment protocols.
We compare our two protocols, FrontLoading and Balanced,
against baselines called “NoStaging” and “RandomStaging”. The
NoStaging protocol places all machines into a single cluster and
treats them all as representatives to promote deployment speed at
the possible cost of a high upgrade overhead. For this reason, NoS-
taging should be used for simple and urgent upgrades, such as secu-
rity patches. The RandomStaging protocol resembles Balanced, but
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the order of deployment to clusters is random. Although Random-
Staging may not have any real use in practice, it does allow us to
isolate the benefit of staged deployment from that of intelligent ma-
chine clustering. To evaluate this protocol, we create a scenario in
which the problems are uniformly distributed across the deployment
order.
Since we do not have an underlying set of machine environments,
we consider two deployment scenarios for the Balanced protocol:
1) “best-case”, in which the representatives discover problems at
the latest possible time, producing the most favorable latency; and
2) “worst-case”, with the problems being encountered early on, re-
sulting in the worst latency. We compare the protocols in terms of
their latencies and upgrade overheads.
Deployment Results
Most importantly, we expect our staged protocols to have signifi-
cantly lower upgrade overhead than NoStaging. This benefit should
come with little or no penalty in terms of upgrade latency.
Sound clustering. Our protocols indeed exhibit much lower up-
grade overhead than NoStaging. With NoStaging, all machines that
exhibit problems (m, in total) fail testing, whereas many fewer do
so with the other three protocols thanks to their staged deployment
(presumably, m >> p, i.e., the number of problematic machines is
much greater than the number of problems, p). The main reason for
this result is that staging forces the deployment to halt at the first
cluster that exhibits a problem, sparing other machines from expe-
riencing the same problem. Since the clustering is sound with no
misplaced machines and we assume that user-machine testing finds
the problem if one exists, the representative of each cluster with
a problem experiences it. Hence, the total number of test failures
is p for Balanced and RandomStaging. As expected, Balanced has
lower overhead than FrontLoading. With FrontLoading, representa-
tives of all clusters with machines exhibiting the prevalent problem
(p+Cp in total, where Cp is the number of additional clusters with
problematic machines) fail testing.
Figure 3.6 shows the CDF of the upgrade latency, confirming
our intuition about the protocols we consider. In NoStaging, 75%
of the machines pass the upgrade test right away (at the cost of
the high upgrade overhead we just discussed). In the best-case sce-
nario, Balanced quickly applies the upgrade successfully at a large
fraction of machines, significantly sooner than FrontLoading. Since
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Figure 3.6: CDF of the per-cluster upgrade latency under sound clus-
tering.
FrontLoading has an initial parallel testing and debugging phase,
most successful upgrades are delayed by several debugging times
at the vendor (500 time units each). Nevertheless, the last clus-
ter applies the upgrade sooner under FrontLoading than the other
staged protocols, especially when the number of clusters is large,
since FrontLoading’s second phase does not have an extra step of
testing at representatives. RandomStaging’s latency lies between
that of the best-case and the worst-case scenarios for Balanced. We
also see that additional clusters (when C > 0) slow down the se-
quential phases of the staged protocols.
Imperfect clustering. Figure 3.7 shows the CDF of the per-
cluster latency when we position the misplaced machine (a prob-
lematic machine that behaves differently from the rest of its cluster)
in the first or the last cluster in the order.
We see that FrontLoading can be further slowed down if the mis-
placed machine is in the first cluster. Arguably, this is in agreement
with this protocol’s main strategy. With its best-case scenario, Bal-
anced is similarly slowed down in this case when the entire first
cluster tests the upgrade and we encounter the misplaced machine.
When the misplaced machine is in the last cluster in the order, this
protocol is only marginally affected. Since it tests on all machines,
NoStaging is not affected by the presence of the misplaced machine.
Overall, the main trends among the protocols remain and the up-
grade overhead is simply augmented by one extra machine that fails
testing for all protocols.
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Figure 3.7: CDF of the upgrade latency under imperfect clustering. The
position of the misplaced machine (its cluster in the deployment order)
is shown in parenthesis after protocol names.
3.5 Conclusion
We introduce Mirage, a distributed framework that integrates de-
ployment, user-machine testing, and problem reporting into the de-
velopment cycle of software upgrades. The design of Mirage is moti-
vated by our survey of system administrators, described in chapter
2, that points to a high incidence of problematic upgrades, and to
the difference between vendor and user environments as one of the
important causes of upgrade problems. We describe in detail two
key innovations in Mirage: the clustering of user machines accord-
ing to their environments and the staged deployment of upgrades
to these clusters.
Our evaluation demonstrates that our clustering algorithm a-
chieves its goal of separating machines with dissimilar environments
in different clusters, while not creating an impractically large num-
ber of clusters. The algorithm performs substantially better when
the vendor provides parsers for all of the environmental resources of
the application. A simulation study of two staged deployment pro-
tocols demonstrates that staging significantly reduces upgrade over-
head, while still achieving low deployment latency. Furthermore, a
suitable choice of protocol allows a vendor to achieve different ob-
jectives.
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Chapter 4
Concolic Execution for
Testing Software Upgrades
4.1 Introduction
Deriving a correct software implementation is a difficult and ardu-
ous task. Programmers are often under time constraints to meet
release deadlines, and therefore use a variety of static and dynamic
analysis techniques to improve software reliability. In chapter 2, we
presented a survey which demonstrates that software upgrades rou-
tinely ship with problems. To reduce the impact of those problems,
in chapter 3, we described staged deployment, a technique that al-
lows the vendor to deploy the upgrade in multiple stages, detect
problems early, and reduce the exposure of users to these problems.
Of course, this technique only makes sense after the vendor has
gained enough confidence that most problems have already been
eliminated. Even with staged deployment, the vendor needs to test
the application up-front, requiring suitable techniques and tools.
Then, during staged deployment, users (and in particular cluster
representatives) must again test the upgrade and report problems.
Since users in general do not have the skills necessary to test an
application, it is necessary to provide a fully automated solution.
Static analysis [4, 6] can automatically check many useful prop-
erties, e.g., whether the API is being used properly. Unfortunately,
static analysis can be incomplete and miss many important prob-
lems, or it can overwhelm the tester with a large number of spurious
warnings. For user-machine testing, it is inadequate, as it is too ab-
stract and fails to take into the account the actual environment in
which the application is running.
A larger class of programming errors can be identified using dy-
namic analysis or testing [40]. Any mature program has a test suite
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that has been put together over time. A classic goal for testing is ad-
equate code coverage. Ideally, testing should cover each statement of
a program at least once. This seemingly simple task is complicated
by the exponential explosion in the number of paths, resulting from
branches in the source code. Many tools can maximize the code cov-
erage achieved by a set of inputs [53]. Unfortunately, achieving full
coverage is difficult, even for mature code with several decades of
development [10]. Furthermore, manual test generation is a labor-
intensive task and requires significant investment from the software
vendor. For user-machine testing, it is difficult to use test cases and
make sure that they are compatible with the user environment. For
instance, a test case may exercise a feature of the application that is
not meant to work given the current configuration of the application
at the user site, and may therefore trigger a false positive.
An approach for comprehensive, automatic test generation that
has gained considerable attention recently is symbolic execution
[10, 11, 27]. The goal of symbolic execution is to systematically
explore all possible paths in a program, looking for conditions that
may lead the program to crash (e.g., de-referenced null pointers,
divisions by zero, off-by-one array accesses, and failed asserts). In
more detail, a symbolic execution engine marks all program input as
symbolic (i.e., having arbitrary value), and then runs the code while
propagating the symbolic inputs to program variables. When it en-
counters a branch, the engine queries a constraint solver to compute
the conditions that can lead to the two sides of the branch, updates
the cumulative constraints for each side, and takes both sides in
parallel. The engine proceeds to systematically cover all branches
and explore all paths, if sufficient time is available. As it traverses
the entire program, the engine also creates and explores constraints
that check for potential crash situations.
A variation of symbolic execution, called concolic execution [9],
has the same full-coverage goal but explores paths in a different
manner. In concolic execution, the program is first executed with a
random set of inputs, e.g., all zeros. Every time the program exe-
cutes a branch, the concolic execution engine records the constraints
on the input that led to the taken side of the branch. It also records
constraints that check for possible crashes. After execution with
this input is completed, the engine has a list of constraints. It then
negates, one at a time, each of these constraints, and invokes the
constraint solver to find a set of inputs that satisfies the constraints.
The engine then re-executes the program, using as inputs the values
selected by the solver. As before, it records the constraints it finds.
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The process repeats until all paths are explored or the available time
expires.
Although promising, these approaches have several problems.
Most obviously, the number of paths to explore is usually extremely
large, typically exponential in the size of the code. Several heuristics
can be used to try and optimize the code coverage given a certain
time budget, but those heuristics tend to get overwhelmed and get
stuck in various places of the code. The consequence is that symbolic
(or concolic) execution currently does not deliver on the promise of
providing thorough, exhaustive testing. Instead, it provides only
partial coverage of potentially uninteresting parts of the code. This
problem is further exacerbated when doing regression testing. In
this case, running symbolic or concolic execution is not ideal, as
it always starts testing the application from the beginning and will
therefore test over and over again the same parts of the code instead
of focusing on the new or modified code.
In this chapter, we argue that it is necessary to develop new tech-
niques to make symbolic execution suitable for regression testing of
software upgrades. We present Oasis, a state-of-the-art concolic ex-
ecution engine designed as the testing component of Mirage. Oasis
can be used for up-front testing at the vendor or for integration test-
ing on user machines. In Oasis, we experiment with novel techniques
to enable focused testing of the new code in a software upgrade. In
particular, we extend state of the art concolic execution [28, 10] in
the following ways:
• Oasis implements a new search heuristic which uses a com-
bination of static and dynamic analysis to identify the parts
of the code modified in, or affected by, the upgrade. It then
steers the exploration to cover those parts earlier and more in-
tensively. This heuristic can be used at the vendor for up-front
testing, or on the user machine to detect integration problems.
• We propose interactive symbolic execution, a new technique
allowing the vendor to understand and influence the explo-
ration of the code through a graphical user interface. This
enables development of better search heuristics or interactive
guidance to manually force the concolic execution engine to
explore interesting parts of the code.
• For user-machine testing, Oasis leverages existing input on the
user machines (such as configuration files) to avoid spending
a large amount of time exploring input parsing code.
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Oasis includes an optimization for testing upgraded code. Specif-
ically, Oasis pinpoints the differences between the old and the new
versions of the program (hereafter called ”new code”), and priori-
tizes the exploration of paths and constraints relating to new code.
During exploration, each time Oasis can choose to follow a specific
side of a branch, it uses an inter-procedural control flow graph to
compute the distance between the branch and the closest piece of
yet uncovered new code. The distance is expressed as the number
of branches (i.e., nodes in the cfg) and represents the expected dif-
ficulty in reaching this part of the code. Oasis thus systematically
schedules the next path for exploration that is the closest to yet
uncovered new code. During execution of each path, Oasis dynami-
cally tracks the effect of the new code on the rest of the code. This
way, it identifies regions of the old code who would have behaved
differently had the new code not been executed. When schedul-
ing paths for exploration, if several branches are at equal distance
from the next block of uncovered new code, Oasis favors branches
who themselves have been affected by the execution of new code.
This heuristic allows Oasis to more thoroughly test the new code,
which is the most likely place to find bugs when regression testing.
Other engines (symbolic or concolic) do not explicitly target new
code and may waste precious time exhaustively exploring parts of
the program that have already been tested in previous versions.
Along the lines of trying to cover hard-to-reach parts of the
code, previous work has demonstrated that using existing test cases
to bootstrap the exploration of the code allows symbolic execution
to reach deep parts of the program much faster [28]. We extend
this by leveraging existing input when doing integration testing on
user machines. Oasis starts the execution of the program and uses
concrete input for each configuration and systems file. The list of
those files can be specified by the developer, or inferred by Mirage
(see chapter 3). For regular input (i.e., not coming from the envi-
ronment), Oasis uses symbolic memory and proceeds as a normal
concolic engine. If available, Oasis uses previously recorded concrete
input. For instance, some representatives (such as system admin-
istrators in companies) may want to record specific input scenarios
to test important features of an application after an upgrade. Oasis
provides infrastructure so simplify recording of the input and uses it
to speed up testing. Leveraging the input from the environment and
the recorded scenarios, Oasis quickly passes input validation and is
able to test deep paths in the application. Other engines (symbolic
or concolic) would have difficulty reaching these deep paths within
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the same time budget.
In some cases, even with the help of concrete input, existing test
cases, and fancy heuristics, it may be difficult to cover the interest-
ing parts of the code (such as the new code) in a reasonable amount
of time. Others have experimented with state-merging [7] or us-
ing higher level constraints solver [26, 33] to address the problem
of state explosion and improve coverage. While those techniques
are very interesting and promising, much research is still needed
before they scale and become practical for large software systems.
In this dissertation, we propose a completely different and new ap-
proach called ”Interactive symbolic execution”. Instead of trying
to improve the technology to scale symbolic execution, ”interactive
symbolic execution” exposes the problem of path explosion to the
tester. Through a graphical user interface, the tester can visualize
the state and progress of the symbolic exploration. Each path is
displayed with its input, set of symbolic constraints and coverage
statistics. Interactive symbolic execution is very useful to under-
stand how the heuristic progresses and develop new ones tailored to
the particular program or testing goal at hand. Furthermore, the
tester can decide to interactively guide the exploration, for instance
by changing the priority of some paths or canceling others. This al-
lows the tester to manually drive the exploration towards interesting
parts of the code.
When Oasis detects a problem, it automatically produces a de-
tailed report including the input necessary to reproduce the bug.
This considerably simplifies the problem of debugging for the ven-
dor. When used for user-machine testing, Mirage stops deployment
of the upgrade as soon as Oasis detects a problem. Oasis then sends
the bug report to the vendor. While reporting the complete input
is likely to leak privacy, we assume here the existence of business
agreements between the vendor and the representatives that guar-
antee confidentiality. In chapter 5 we describe another technique to
report problems in a way that better preserves privacy.
We present a preliminary evaluation of Oasis and its novel tech-
niques: the heuristic to drive exploration of the code towards new
or affected code in the upgrade, and interactive symbolic execution.
Our results suggest that our heuristic is effective in more intensively
testing upgraded code, and that interactive symbolic execution is a
useful addition to understand and complement exploration heuris-
tics in symbolic execution.
The contributions of this chapter are the following:
• The design and implementation of Oasis, a state-of-the-art
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1 main ( ) {
2 /∗ Memory fo r 200 con f i g parameter s t r i n g s ,
3 each max of 80 chars long ∗/
4 char con f igVars [ 2 0 0 ] [ 8 1 ] ;
5 for ( int j = 0 ; j < 200 ; j++ )
6 s t r cpy ( con f igVars [ j ] , ”” ) ;
7
8 int c f = open ( c o n f i g f i l e ) ;
9 int i = 0 ;
10 while ( !EOF( c f ) && i < 200) {
11 char∗ r = r e a d l i n e (&conf igVars [ i ] , c f ) ;
12 i f ( ! r | | ! i s V a l i d ( con f igVars [ i ] ) ) {
13 e x i t (−1);
14 }
15 i ++;
16 }
17
18 /∗ Buf fer to read f i l e content s ∗/
19 char∗ b u f f e r ;
20 b u f f e r = (char∗) mal loc ( s izeof (char )∗1024 ) ;
21 do something ( bu f f e r , con f i gVars ) ;
22 f r e e ( b u f f e r ) ;
23
24 /∗ The p r i n t f i s an i n v a l i d mem re f e r ence ∗/
25 i f ( ! strcmp ( con f igVars [ 1 0 ] , ” va lue ” ) ) {
26 p r i n t f ( ”\%c” , b u f f e r [ someindex ] ) ;
27 }
28 }//end main
Listing 4.1: This example bug demonstrates the difficulty that con-
colic executions have in discovering bugs ”deep” in the code and
how execution with valid inputs can alleviate the problem.
concolic execution engine supporting heuristics to effectively
test software upgrades.
• A new heuristic to drive symbolic execution towards new or
affected code in an upgrade.
• A new approach called Interactive Symbolic Execution allow-
ing the tester to interactively understand and influence the
exploration of the program in a symbolic execution engine
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2
provides additional background and motivation. Section 4.3 details
the design and implementation of Oasis. Section 4.4 presents our
preliminary evaluation. Finally section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Overview
We motivate the design of Oasis using the example in Listing 4.1.
This listing is a small variation of a real bug in the ssh − keysign
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Figure 4.1: Path exploration by a conventional concolic execution
engine on typical code. EOF in this figure refers to the check for
the end of file or any other way of limiting input. Boxes with ques-
tion marks refer to symbolic input that grows in size during path
exploration.
tool of OpenSSH version 3.0 [44]. The code reads a line at a time
from the configuration file and validates it (lines 8−16). When this
is done, it allocates a buffer, uses it (line 21), and frees it (line 22).
However, under a very specific condition, it tries to print the now
freed buffer (line 26).
We now describe how a conventional concolic execution engine
would handle this program. The first input to the program is the
configuration file. We assume that this file has 1000 bytes, for ex-
ample. Concolic execution starts execution with all inputs set to
a random value, e.g., all zeros. Thus, the entire configuration file
would have 1000 bytes of zeros. We then start execution of the
program with this input. The function readline (line 11) reads the
input until it sees a line termination character (LTC) or until it has
read 80 bytes, whichever comes first. With the given input, readline
would read 80 zeros, which would fail to validate, and the program
would exit. At that point, the execution would have generated 80
constraints of the form bytei 6= LTC, where 0 ≤ i ≤ 80. The engine
would then negate each of these constraints in turn, causing it to
take an input sequence that does not have 80 zeros as its first 80
bytes. For instance, it could try a 1 followed by 79 zeros next. With
this input, the same sequence of events would occur, and so on. It
is easy to see that the concolic engine would spend an enormous
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amount of time, simply exploring the very first part of the program,
where input is read and validated. It would do so until it guessed
a set of string values that pass the validation tests, and, until it
did so, it would never reach the code past the input validation, and
therefore it would not be aware of the code that causes the bug.
Figure 4.1 illustrates path exploration by a conventional concolic
execution engine on our example code.
Let’s now consider the situation where we have a number of valid
configurations from a test suite or from an actual user environment.
For simplicity, assume we have just one such configuration file. Oa-
sis leverages this input as we described in the previous section. It
would start executing with this configuration file as input, pass the
input validation, buffer allocation and free, and arrive at the if state-
ment on line 25. Most likely, the if condition would not hold, and
Oasis would exit without accessing the buffer in the body of the if
statement. In this execution, Oasis would have collected constraints
on each byte of input during the validation phase, a certain num-
ber of constraints in the doSomething() function, plus a constraint
stating that the if condition on line 25 is false.
In the next step, Oasis would now negate one of these con-
straints. Let’s say that our strategy is to negate them one by one,
starting from the first recorded one. This would cause us to pick an
input different from the one we had on the first line of the config-
uration file, and most likely fail input validation. The same would
happen for all the constraints related to the input variables and the
doSomething() function, but then we would hit on the the con-
straint that says that the if condition was false. We would negate
this one, find an input, and this one would trigger the bug.
Exploring this line of thought a little further, assume that the
printf was a new line of code that was added as the result of a
new version. In that case, since it is the closest to the new code,
we would negate the condition right before printf and immediately
find the problem. A concolic engine could not have found this bug
so soon, because it would have had trouble generating valid input
and then would spend a large amount of time exploring the input
validation code and the code in doSomething().
In a more general case, the tester may be interested in testing
specific parts of the code, whether because they are part of the
new version, or simply because they have not been tested enough
yet. In that case, given the high number of constraints collected
and the resulting number of possible paths to explore, with any
given heuristic, the tester is left waiting and hoping that those parts
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are going to be explored by the concolic engine. An alternative
is to manually write test cases, but this is tedious and difficult.
With interactive symbolic execution, Oasis would expose the list of
constraints yet to be explored, along with possible input solutions
and computed distances to uncovered code in the control flow graph.
Let’s say that the tester is more interested in testing the code in
doSomething() than the input validation code. The tester would
be able to identify the corresponding constraints easily and ask the
engine to explore them immediately. Alternatively, the tester could
decide to remove some or all of the constraints related to parsing the
input and therefore allow the engine to focus on the doSomething()
constraints immediately.
This style of program is quite common: an extensive first phase
in which the input is read, parsed and validated, followed by a
second phase in which the program performs its real function with
inputs that have been validated. Web servers are another example.
They read a large configuration file, before they start accepting
incoming requests. Even in the handling of an individual request,
the input string is first parsed and validated, before the requested
operation is executed.
It is this observation that motivated the use of valid inputs to
start Oasis execution along with a heuristic directing exploration to-
wards new code and ”interactive symbolic execution”. The heuristic
and interactive symbolic execution are two different ways to keep
the exploration focused on interesting parts of the code, and using
existing input Oasis can proceed past the input validation phase and
test the part of the program in which it does its real work. With
regular concolic execution, the engine is liable to get bogged down
for a long time in testing less relevant parts of the code.
We want to stress that we do not argue that Oasis is better than
regular concolic execution in some absolute sense, in terms of finding
more bugs, or finding them more quickly, or providing much better
coverage. Rather, we argue that we are able to explore certain parts
of a program much sooner than a regular engine, in particular new
parts of the code that are deep in the execution.
4.3 Design and Implementation
Oasis Overview
We have derived Oasis through extensive modification of the Crest
open-source concolic execution engine [9]. Oasis instruments C pro-
grams using CIL [42]. The instrumentation is used to propagate
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symbolic information and to flag crash-prone statement (i.e., state-
ments such as assertions, divisions, memory reads and writes). Oasis
incorporates many of the features of current state-of-the-art concolic
and symbolic execution engines [10, 11, 9].
Programs being tested with Oasis always run with concrete in-
puts. This makes interaction with the external environment simple:
programs running with Oasis can interact with outside libraries or
the filesystem. However, in order to be able to track symbolic con-
straints on input that is passed to external libraries, Oasis needs
visibility into the library functions. This is achieved by either re-
compiling those libraries with the instrumentation, or by providing
models. Oasis provides its own instrumented version of uclibc, a
simple libc implementation. In addition, Oasis provides a set of
functions modeling interaction with the filesystem and the network.
This allows Oasis to consider input coming from these sources as
being symbolic (i.e., to log the constraints imposed on this input),
and to support system calls operating on symbolic memory.
To generate inputs exploring different paths in the program, Oa-
sis uses an off-the-shelf constraint solver, called STP [22]. Because
the running time of the solver can be quite high, Oasis tries to re-
duce the complexity of the query to the solver by determining the
minimal set of dependent constraints that need to be solved. To
reduce the number of queries to the solver, Oasis caches previous
solutions from the solver.
When running with previous test cases, Oasis maintains an tree
of constraints, called the exploration tree. This allows it to avoid
exploring several times the same path, for instance when several test
cases share an identical prefix of constraints.
Oasis takes advantages of multi-core architectures by running
the exploration in parallel on multiple-threads. A main scheduling
thread is responsible for running the exploration heuristic and fork-
ing off path to be explored in parallel. A set of worker threads are
responsible for invoking the solver and running the program under
test.
What is Symbolic?
Oasis tracks symbolic constraints on the input, therefore it needs to
know what in the address space of the program is input. There
are different ways of marking input as symbolic. By using the
−symbolic argv parameter of the oasis command, the user can
specify the number of symbolic command line parameters, along
with their size. By inserting calls to oasis sym(address, size) within
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the program, the user can mark a specific address as the beginning
of symbolic input of size size. This is very helpful to mark input
coming from uninstrumented libraries.
Collecting Symbolic Constraints
Oasis instruments the program under test using CIL[42]. For each
statement in the program, the instrumentation adds a few calls to
a library that is used to keep track at runtime of the statements
executed in the program and record the symbolic constraints. The
way Oasis instruments the program is inherited from Crest[9] and
extended in order to allow tracking for bugs. We therefore only
describe here the main aspects of our approach and refer the reader
to the literature for further details.
During execution, Oasis maintains a map of addresses to ex-
pressions, representing the address space of the program, hereafter
named symbolic address space or SAS. An expression in Oasis is
a tree composed of symbolic variables, constants, memory objects
(arrays of expressions), and operators. Whenever input is marked
as being symbolic, Oasis inserts in the SAS, at the address of the
real input, one symbolic variable per byte of input. Oasis records in
the SAS an expression composed of a memory object for each array1
which is allocated (either statically or dynamically) in the program.
Similarly, Oasis deletes memory objects from the SAS, when their
corresponding array is freed. When the program executes a binary
operation, such as an addition or a subtraction, Oasis maintains the
corresponding binary expressions in the SAS.
We refer to an expression as being symbolic if, somewhere in the
tree, the expression references a symbolic variable. In other words,
an expression is symbolic if it involves the input of the program.
While maintaining the symbolic address space, Oasis logs the
symbolic constraints corresponding to control flow in the program.
For instance, when a conditional branch is executed, and the expres-
sion corresponding to the condition is symbolic, a new constraint is
logged. If the program takes the true side of the program, the con-
straint logged is the symbolic expression. If, however, the program
follows the false side of the branch, the constraint logged is the
negation of the symbolic expression.
Before letting the program execute any crash-prone statement,
such as a division or a memory read/write, Oasis checks that the
statement is not going to crash the program. For divisions, it checks
1We handle C structures and buffers similarly.
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that the divisor is not zero, and if it is, it reports a bug. Otherwise,
if the divisor is a symbolic expression, Oasis logs a constraint stating
that the divisor was not zero. Similarly, for memory reads or writes,
Oasis checks that the address being accessed points to a memory
object and is within the bounds of this object. If this is not the case,
Oasis reports a bug. If it is, and the memory accessed is symbolic,
Oasis logs a constraint stating that the offset is within the range of
the memory object (i.e., 0 < offset < memory object size− 1).
Oasis handles reads and writes to memory through symbolic
pointers in the same way it handles reads and writes to arrays and
structures. Oasis supports symbolic pointers to pointers. For each
access, Oasis logs a constraint stating the current value of the sym-
bolic pointer. During path exploration, it then enumerates every
possible location to which the symbolic pointer to pointer can point.
Handling System Calls
In a way similar to KLEE [10], Oasis provides a set of system call
wrappers that are able to return either symbolic memory or concrete
input, depending on whether the user has decided to treat a certain
file or socket as symbolic input or not. The user can decide how
many symbolic files will be used and their maximum size.
System calls do not always behave deterministically. For in-
stance, when executing the read() system call, the kernel can de-
cide to return between 0 and the amount of memory requested. For
this reason, programs are required to check the return value of read
and behave accordingly. To allow exploration of those paths, Oasis
provides an option to turn the return value of those system calls
symbolic. When this option is enabled, Oasis associates a symbolic
variable and a constraint to the return value of each system call,
allowing subsequent paths to explore different values. This is par-
ticularly helpful with some system calls, such as read or select,
which can return any combination of file descriptors ready for I/O.
Constraint Solving
To drive the exploration of different code paths, after each execu-
tion of the program, Oasis negates one of the logged constraints
and invokes STP to try to find a set of input values satisfying the
symbolic constraints.
Because of the way constraints are modeled in Oasis, the transla-
tion of those constraints into STP is straightforward. Each symbolic
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variable is translated into an 8-bit STP bitvector, memory objects
into STP arrays, and binary operations into STP operations.
During an execution, Oasis routinely collects hundreds or even
thousands of constraints. To explore a different path, Oasis negates
one of those constraints and seeks to find a suitable input satisfying
the negated constraint and all the previous constraints. The time
needed for the solver to find a solution can be considerable. For-
tunately, the negated constraint most of the time only involves one
or a few symbolic variables, which are themselves involved only in
a few other constraints. Thus, it suffices to query the solver for a
solution to the set of constraints involving the variables appearing
in the negated constraint. For example, consider the following set
of recorded constraints: {x + y = 10; y < 10; z = 3}. Solving the
constraint z 6= 3 does not require solving the two first constraints.
We therefore only query the solver for the constraint z 6= 3, and
reuse previous values of x and y. Oasis inherits from Crest its abil-
ity to compute subsets of dependent constraints before querying the
solver.
Constraint Cache
Despite trying to optimize the query to the solver, the time needed
for the solver to find a solution can still be considerable.
To avoid expensive calls to the solver, state-of-the-art concolic
(and symbolic) execution engines implement a cache of solutions. In
Oasis, we use a simple table mapping a set of dependent constraints
to the corresponding solution. For instance, reusing the example
of the previous section, assume that we collect constraints {x +
y = 10; y < 10; z = 3} with solution {x = 4; y = 6; z = 3}, after
executing the program. We insert two entries into the cache: one
lists the constraints {x + y = 10; y < 10; } mapping to the solution
{x = 4; y = 6}, whereas the other lists the constraint {z = 3}
mapping to solution {z = 3}.
Because programs frequently re-execute the same parts of the
code with different inputs, they impose the same constraints on dif-
ferent symbolic variables. Oasis uses this observation to increase
hit rates. Specifically, before inserting a solution for a set of de-
pendent constraints in the cache, we rename the symbolic variables
in the constraints in the order in which they appear. Returning to
the previous example, we rename the variables x and y in the con-
straint {x+y = 10} to {v0 +v1 = 10}. If we ever encounter another
constraint of the same form, but referencing different variables, we
quickly find a solution in the cache.
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Running with Actual Inputs
Oasis leverages any valid input available in order to explore deeper
and longer code paths sooner than traditional concolic engines. The
input can come from a test suite or from actual files present on the
machine on which Oasis is running.
To take advantage of these valid inputs, Oasis needs to know
the constraints resulting from the execution of the program with
those inputs. This is done by running the program within Oasis in
”recording” mode, and feed the input normally to it. In recording
mode, the models of the filesystem and the network described in
Section 4.3 operate as simple pass-through, in which they read from
the filesystem or the network normally and tag the input as being
symbolic.
This has to be done only once for each set of inputs. Oasis saves
the inputs and the constraints to disk, and reuses them whenever
the program needs to be tested again. Of course, if a new version
of the program is to be tested, then the new version needs to be
executed with the old inputs, and new constraints collected. Oasis
does that automatically.
When using Oasis for user-machine testing, only some files are
used with concrete values, the rest of the input is symbolic. In this
case, no recording is required. An environment variable is used to
tell Oasis which files will be used concretely (for instance, all files
in /etc). All files specified by this variable will be treated normally
and the system call models will act as pass-through to the actual
system calls.
Prioritizing new Code
When doing regression testing, Oasis takes advantage of the code
differences between the old and the new version of the program.
It uses this information to prioritize the exploration of paths and
constraints that are affected by new code.
In the current version of Oasis, we use a very simple code differ-
encing scheme: we simply compute a (textual) diff between the old
version and the new version. More sophisticated approaches could
be used, e.g., relying on information from a program development
environment. These techniques could do a better job of identifying
the precise differences, but the principle of how to use the informa-
tion in Oasis remains the same.
During an Oasis execution, when a statement creates or manip-
ulates an expression, Oasis checks if the statement is present in the
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diff. If so, it flags the symbolic expression as being “new”. This
new flag is propagated to every expression in which a new expres-
sion is referenced. The propagation continues until the expression is
logged in a symbolic constraint, which is then also flagged as being
new. Such new constraints will be given priority in the exploration
of different paths, as explained below.
To direct the search towards new code, Oasis builds an inter
procedural control-flow graph of the program (hereafter called cfg).
This graph is a binary tree with each node representing a branch in
the program and edges representing the code in between branches.
After each program execution, Oasis updates coverage statistics by
marking which nodes and edges of the cfg have been covered. It then
computes the distance between each explorable constraint (branch)
and the closest node or edge in the graph which has not been covered
yet. It also computes the distance to the next uncovered node or
edge which is part of the new code. The distance is expressed as the
number of nodes in the cfg that need to be crossed before reaching
the target. The distance metric is therefore inversely proportional to
the likelihood of reaching the targeted code by exploring the source
branch.
Search Strategy
Listing 4.2 shows pseudo-code for the heuristic that Oasis imple-
ments. There are three important data structures: the CACHE
that holds solutions to constraints obtained in earlier executions,
CONSTRAINTS which is a sorted list of constraints yet to be ex-
plored, and a QUEUE that holds the next constraints scheduled for
exploration.
During initialization, Oasis executes the program under test with
random input first, then with each set of the valid inputs (if avail-
able), inserting the results in CACHE and CONSTRAINTS. The
worker threads and the main thread are subsequently started.
In the main thread, Oasis keeps the CONSTRAINTS list sorted
according to the heuristic, and pushes work to the worker threads’
QUEUE. When a worker thread finishes his job, the main thread
updates the coverage statistics, resorts the CONSTRAINTS and
pushes more work to the QUEUE.
Each worker thread waits until there are constraints in the
QUEUE. It then pops one, negates it, finds a solution for the negated
constraint (either from the cache or by invoking the solver), executes
the program with the new set of inputs, and finally inserts the new
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execution, with its inputs and constraints, in CACHE and CON-
STRAINTS.
The constraints are sorted for exploration in the following order.
First, we examine constraints that involve crash-prone operations
(those that may crash the program) coming from new code. Sec-
ond, we consider the remaining constraints that involve crash-prone
operations. Third, we examine constraints that are at the closest
distance from yet uncovered new code. If several constraints are
at the same distance, constraints affected by the new code are fa-
vored. Fourth, we pick constraints that are affected by the new
code. Finally, we pick constraints that are at the closest distance
from uncovered code.The idea behind this ordering is to drive the
search first towards new code that can potentially cause bugs, then
to new code, and finally to other code. Within each of these five
priorities, we look at the constraint in the order that they were
recorded in the program. Since Oasis starts execution from valid
input, it already reaches parts of the code deep in the execution.
Exploring constraints in the order in which they appear allows to
explore those paths with more breadth.
Interactive Symbolic Execution
Oasis exposes to the tester its main data structures through a graph-
ical user interface. Figure 4.2 shows a screenshot of the main win-
dow. This interface is built using the QT toolkit and presents win-
dows and buttons allowing to understand and interfere with the
exploration. This is particularly helpful when using Oasis for up-
front testing, for instance, by the vendor.
The main window exposes the list of sorted constraints. For
clarity, those constraints are displayed as a tree. Each top level en-
try displays the informations for a branch in the code, such as its
location in the source code, the distance to the uncovered code and
the distance to uncovered new code. Second level entries represent
the instances of the branches that have been discovered during ex-
ploration. For each branch in the code, there may be from a few
to several hundreds of instances collected during the various paths
explored.
A second panel displays the scheduling decisions and whether
the worker threads were able to solve the particular constraints and
run with input. This allows the tester to visualize the progress of
the heuristic and to realize if Oasis is currently stuck exploring a
large number of uninteresting branches.
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Because Oasis keeps running while the tester inspects its behav-
ior, it may be difficult for the tester to make a decision before the
state of Oasis changes. Therefore, a button allows the tester to put
the exploration on hold while he decides on the best course of action,
at which point clicking on the same button resumes exploration.
The tester can select one or more constraints in the list of con-
straints and decide to kill them. This instantly removes them from
the CONSTRAINTS data structure. Because Oasis keeps explor-
ing new paths, it is possible that new instances of the constraints
that were killed are discovered again in subsequent executions. In
order to avoid having the tester repeatedly kill constraints from the
same branches over and over again, Oasis allows the tester to in-
sert them in a blacklist. This way, newly discovered constraints for
blacklisted branches are discarded immediately and do not clog the
CONSTRAINTS queue anymore.
Finally, the tester can decide to schedule some constraints im-
mediately, in which case the selected constraints are pushed to the
QUEUE and explored by the worker threads.
The graphical user interface allows the tester to drive Oasis’s
exploration in a focused way. Instead of letting the heuristic spend a
large amount of time in potentially uninteresting places of the code,
the tester can decide to interfere with it and optimize the coverage.
While very useful when regression testing an upgrade, this can also
be used for other purposes, such as for instance debugging, when
the developer suspects the area of the code in which the bug lies
but does not know exactly where.
4.4 Evaluation and Discussion
In this section, we present a preliminary qualitative evaluation of
the novel aspects of Oasis. We leave a more thorough, quantitative
evaluation for future work.
We run Oasis with two versions of the uServer, an open-source
Web server with approximatively 32K lines of code. We configure
Oasis to provide the following input to the program: between 0 and
3 arguments of up to ten bytes of symbolic memory, and between 0
and 2 sockets returning up to 50 bytes of symbolic memory.
Prioritizing New Code
To compare our heuristic prioritizing new code (hereafter called
diff search), we implement a heuristic optimized for code cov-
erage and inspired by the one used in KLEE [10]. This heuristic
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is very similar to diff search except that it ignores all the prior-
ities related to the new code. It therefore always seeks to schedule
branches which are at the smallest distance from the next uncovered
block of code. We call this heuristic cover search. In addition to
cover search, we also compare with a simple depth first search
approach (dfs).
Figure 4.3 shows the code coverage obtained with the three con-
figurations of Oasis. As can be seen from the figure, diff search
and cover search end up covering the same amount of code af-
ter 30 minutes of exploration. DFS performs slightly worse, which
is surprising considering that the literature describing similar tech-
niques shows much greater benefits over DFS. This can be explained
by the fact that the uServer is a complicated program processing
highly structured input. It is therefore difficult for any strategy to
make significant progress. In this example, diff search is actually
the fastest strategy to reach the maximum code coverage achieved.
This result shows that prioritizing new code does not necessarily
penalize code coverage in general.
Figure 4.4 shows the coverage results for the new code only. In
this case again, the diff search performs best, albeit only slightly.
Exploration of the new code in this example is bottlenecked by the
difficulty to cover new areas of the code.
Finally, Figure 4.5 shows how many times the symbolic explo-
ration chose to explore constraints that were affected by the new
code. This reflects the intensity with which the new code is ex-
plored. In this case, diff search is the clear winner, with almost
twice as many affected constraints scheduled as the other heuristics.
We do not claim with these results that Oasis is better in an
absolute sense. Rather, we advocate that our heuristic makes it
possible to explore the new or affected code much more intensively
without sacrificing coverage in general.
Interactive Symbolic Execution
Interactive symbolic execution has proven a valuable tool to imple-
ment and debug the heuristics in Oasis. Furthermore, we have used
it to observe the progression of the diff search heuristic in the ex-
periment described above. We report here on several observations
that we made while trying to understand the results:
• Looking at the exploration of the uServer, it is easy to iden-
tify some areas of the code responsible for a lot of exploration.
For instance, the argument processing code keeps generating
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dozens of constraints for exploration. Next is the http parser.
While it may be undesirable to skip those code areas alto-
gether, using the blacklist to avoid testing them intensively
should prove useful in getting to test other areas of the code
more intensively.
• Any heuristic selects branches based on a set of criteria and
metrics. In the case of the diff search heuristic, those met-
rics are distances measured in the control flow graph of the
program. While running we observed that the relevance of the
metrics varies over time. At the very beginning of the explo-
ration, the metrics tend to be relevant and coincide well with
our expectations looking at the set of constraints and their
location in the source code. However, the more exploration
progresses the more difficult it is to relate the distance metric
to opportunities for better coverage. When this happens, a
possible solution would be to switch to a different heuristic.
• When trying to guide the exploration of the code, the fine
granularity of branches and constraints makes it difficult to
pick a relevant set of branches manually. For instance, many
branches are generated in library routines such as strcmp().
Grouping constraints based on the outcome of library routines
would probably allow better manual control over the symbolic
exploration.
While we have not yet conducted a thorough evaluation of In-
teractive Symbolic Execution, our preliminary experiments allowed
us to gain a better understanding of the problems and difficulties
faced by the search heuristic. Interactive Symbolic Execution shows
promise as a key technique in advancing the state of the art in sym-
bolic execution and automatic search heuristics.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we introduce Oasis, a new concolic execution engine.
The design of Oasis is motivated by the key observation that tradi-
tional concolic and symbolic execution engines are not well suited
to regression testing of software upgrades.
Oasis improves on current state-of-the-art concolic and symbolic
engines by implementing a new heuristic to prioritize the exploration
of new or affected code in the upgrade. Furthermore, we propose in-
teractive symbolic execution, a new approach exposing the problem
of path exploration to the tester using a graphical user interface.
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The tester can use interactive symbolic execution as a learning tool
to develop new heuristics or as a way to manually influence the
exploration and steer it toward interesting areas of the code.
We present a preliminary evaluation of our system. Our results
indicate that our heuristic successfully explores the new or affected
code more intensively than existing techniques without sacrificing
code coverage. We used interactive symbolic execution to under-
stand the behavior of the heuristic and we conclude that it is a
promising technique to advance the state of the art in symbolic
execution.
In the future, we plan to use Oasis to find new bugs in popular
open source applications. We are especially interested in using Oasis
with applications that already have a large test suite to further
demonstrate its ability to explore some parts of the code sooner
than traditional symbolic/concolic execution engines.
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1 Result = ( inputs , c o n s t r a i n t s )
2
3 I n i t i a l i z a t i o n {
4 run with random input
5 put r e s u l t in CACHE and CONSTRAINTS
6 run each t e s t case
7 put r e s u l t in CACHE and CONSTRAINTS
8 s t a r t worker threads
9 s t a r t main thread
10 }
11
12 Main Thread {
13 while (CONSTRAINTS i s not empty ) {
14 so r t ed = Sort (CONSTRAINTS)
15 push top e n t r i e s from sor t ed to QUEUE
16 s i g n a l worker threads
17 wait for worker threads to f i n i s h
18 update coverage
19 }
20 }
21
22 Worker Thread {
23 while ( t rue ) {
24 i f (QUEUE i s empty ) {
25 wait for s i g n a l from main thread
26 }
27 pop c o n s t r a i n t C from QUEUE
28 negate C
29 input = FindSolut ion ( !C, E)
30 {
31 run the program with input
32 put r e s u l t i n to CACHE and CONSTRAINTS
33 }
34 s i g n a l main thread
35 }
36 }
37
38 FindSolut ion (C, E) {
39 query cache for input s a t i s f y i n g C
40 i f not there , query s o l v e r
41 return input
42 }
43
44 Sort ( c o n s t r a i n t s ) {
45 s o r t c o n s t r a i n t s accord ing to the f o l l o w i n g p r i o r i t y :
46 1 . dangerous c o n s t r a i n t s in new code
47 2 . remaining dangerous c o n s t r a i n t s
48 3 . c o n s t r a i n t s at the s h o r t e s t d i s t anc e from
49 new uncovered code . Break t i e s by f avo r i ng
50 c o n s t r a i n t s a f f e c t e d by the new code .
51 4 . c o n s t r a i n t s a f f e c t e d by new code
52 5 . c o n s t r a i n t s at the s h o r t e s t d i s t anc e from
53 uncovered code
54 }
Listing 4.2: Search heuristic used in Oasis
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Figure 4.3: Code coverage obtained with the three configurations of
Oasis on the uServer
Figure 4.4: Coverage of the new code obtained with the three con-
figurations of Oasis on the uServer
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Figure 4.5: Coverage of the new or affected constraints obtained
with the three configurations of Oasis on the uServer
62
Chapter 5
Bug Reporting
5.1 Introduction
Despite considerable advances in testing and verification, programs
routinely ship with a number of undiscovered bugs. In chapter 2 we
presented a survey of system administrators, detailing some of the
problems facing users when deploying upgrades. In chapter 3 we
describe staged deployment, a technique that significantly reduces
the number of users impacted by problems by deploying upgrades
in stages over clusters of users with similar environments. Subse-
quently, in chapter 4, we described Oasis, a state of the art concolic
engine that can be used to test upgrades before they are deployed,
or on user machines as part of the staged deployment protocols.
In spite of all of these efforts, some bugs are bound to remain
in the software when it is deployed, and will be discovered and
reported only later by the users. Debugging is an arduous task
in general, and it is even harder when bugs are uncovered by users.
Before the developer can start working on a fix, the problem must be
reproduced. Reporting systems are meant to help with this task, but
they need to strike a balance between privacy concerns, recording
overhead at the user site, and time for the developer to reproduce
the cause of the bug.
Reporting Systems
The current commercial state of the art is represented by the Win-
dows Error Reporting System [24], which automatically generates a
bug report when an application crashes. The bug report includes a
per-thread stack trace, the values of some registers, the name of the
libraries loaded, and portions of the heap. While that information
is helpful, the developer must manually find the path to the bug
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1int main ( int argc , char ∗∗ argv ) {
2char opt ion = read opt i on ( input ) ;
3int r e s u l t = 0
4i f ( opt ion == ’ a ’ )
5r e s u l t = f i b o n a c c i ( 2 0 ) ;
6else i f ( opt ion == ’b ’ )
7r e s u l t = f i b o n a c c i ( 4 0 ) ;
8
9p r i n t f ( ” Result : %d\n” , r e s u l t ) .
10return 0 ;
11}
Listing 5.1: A simple program computing the fibonacci sequence.
among an exponential number of possible paths. Furthermore, the
information contained in the report may leak private information,
which is undesirable and in certain circumstances prevents the use of
the tool altogether. Recently, Zamfir and Candea have shown that
symbolic execution can be used to partially automate the search for
the path to the bug. However, as the manual approach, symbolic
execution suffers from a potentially exponential number of paths to
be explored [58].
An alternative is to record the inputs to the program at the user
site. Inputs leading to failures can be transmitted to the developer,
who uses them to replay the program to the occurrence of the bug.
While avoiding the problem of having to search for the path to the
bug, divulging user inputs is often considered unacceptable from a
privacy viewpoint. Castro et al. generate a set of inputs that is
different from the original input but still leads to the same bug [12].
Their approach does not transfer the original input to the developer,
but requires input logging, whole-program replay, and invocation of
a constraint solver at the user site.
A more direct approach is to record the path to the bug at the
user site, for instance, by instrumenting the program to record the
direction of all branches taken. In its naive form, this approach is
infeasible because of the CPU, storage and transmission overhead
incurred, but in this chapter we demonstrate that the approach can
be optimized by instrumenting only a limited number of branches.
Our Approach
We base our work on the following three observations. First, a
large number of branches do not depend on the program input, and
therefore their outcome need not be logged, because it is known a
priori. We denote branches whose outcome depends on program
input as symbolic. Other branches are denoted as concrete.
Consider the example program in Listing 5.1. Depending on
64
Chapter 5: Bug Reporting
the input parameter, the program computes the fibonacci number
Fn for one of two different values of n. The only input to this
program is the parameter that indicates for which value to compute
the fibonacci number. While this program may have many branches
(especially in the fibonacci function, not shown for conciseness), it
is sufficient to know the outcome of the branches at line 4 and 6
to fully determine the behavior of the program. Indeed, those two
branches are the only symbolic ones, and it suffices to record their
outcome.
A second, related observation is that application branches are
typically either always symbolic or always concrete. In other words,
it is rare that a particular branch at some point in the execution
depends on input and at other points does not. An example of
this can also be seen in Listing 5.1. The branches at lines 4 and
6 always depend on input, the others never do. This property is
almost always true for branches in the application, and often, albeit
not always, true for branches in the libraries.
Restricting our attention to branches that do depend on the in-
put, the third observation is that it is not strictly necessary to record
the outcome of all of those. When we record all such branches, the
result is a unique program path, and therefore no search is required
at the developer’s site. When we record a subset of those branches,
their outcomes no longer define a unique path but a set of possible
paths, among which the developer has to search to find the path to
the bug. In other words, there is a spectrum of possibilities between
(1) no recording at the user site and a search at the developer site
among all possible paths, and (2) complete recording of the out-
come of all branches at the user site and no search at the developer
site. Various points in this spectrum constitute different tradeoffs
between instrumentation overhead at the user and bug reproduction
time at the developer site. (We define bug reproduction as finding
a set of inputs that leads the execution to the bug, or, equivalently,
finding the direction of all branches taken so that they lead the ex-
ecution to the bug.) It is this tradeoff that is explored further in
this chapter.
In particular, we propose three approaches for deciding the set of
branches to instrument. The first approach uses dynamic analysis to
determine the set of branches that depend on input. This approach
is constrained in its effectiveness by the limited coverage of the pro-
gram that the symbolic execution engine used for dynamic analysis
can achieve in a given amount of time. It tends to under-estimate
the number of branches that need to be instrumented, therefore
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leading to reduced instrumentation cost but increased bug repro-
duction time. The time that the symbolic execution engine is al-
lowed to execute gives the developer an additional tuning knob in
the tradeoff: the more time invested in symbolic execution, the bet-
ter the coverage can be, and therefore the more precise the analysis.
The second approach is based on static analysis of the program.
Data flow analysis is used to determine the set of branches that
depend on the input. This approach is limited by the precision of
the static analysis, and in general tends to over-estimate the num-
ber of branches to be instrumented. Thus, this approach favors
increased instrumentation cost in exchange for reduced bug repro-
duction time. The third approach combines the above two. It uses
symbolic execution for a given amount of time, and then marks the
branches that have not yet been visited according to the outcome
of the static analysis.
When a bug in the program occurs, the developer runs the pro-
gram in a modified symbolic execution engine that takes the partial
branch trace as input. At each instrumented branch, the symbolic
execution engine forces the execution to follow the branch direction
specified by the log. In case a symbolic branch has not been logged,
the engine explores both alternatives. Symbolic execution along the
incorrect alternative eventually causes a further branch to take a
direction different from the one recorded in the log. The symbolic
execution engine then aborts the exploration of this alternative, and
turns its attention to the other, correct branch direction.
Non-deterministic events add another dimension to the tradeoff
between logging overhead and bug reproduction time. Either we log
all non-deterministic events during execution so that we can repro-
duce them exactly during replay, but we add overhead at runtime.
Or we do not log all of them, but then a non-deterministic event
during replay may produce an outcome different from the one dur-
ing actual execution. The importance of this tradeoff is amplified if
some branches are not logged. If all branches are logged, then with
high likelihood a different outcome of a non-deterministic event dur-
ing replay is detected quickly, because a subsequent branch takes a
direction different from the one logged during execution. If, how-
ever, not all branches are logged and in particular branches that
follow the non-deterministic event are not logged, then the replay
may require considerable searching to discover the path followed
during the actual execution. We explore this tradeoff for system
calls, one of the principal sources of non-determinism during se-
quential execution.
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Overview of Results
We have implemented the three branch instrumentation methods
described above, in addition to the naive approach that logs all
branches. We explore the tradeoff between instrumentation over-
head and bug reproduction time using an open-source Web server,
the diff utility, and four coreutils programs. We find that the com-
bined approach strikes a better balance between instrumentation
overhead and bug reproduction time than the other two. Moreover,
it enables bug reproduction times that are only slightly higher than
those for the approach based solely on static analysis. In contrast,
this latter approach only marginally reduces logging overhead com-
pared to logging all branches, whereas the approach based solely on
dynamic analysis leads to excessively long times to reproduce bugs.
More concretely, our results show that the combined approach re-
duces instrumentation overhead between 10% and 92%, compared
to the approach based solely on static analysis. At the same time, it
always reproduces the bugs we considered within the allotted time
(1 hour), whereas the dynamic approach fails to do so in 6 out of
16 cases. In all circumstances, we find that selectively logging the
results of system calls is advantageous: it limits bug reproduction
time, and adds only marginally to instrumentation overhead.
Contributions
The contributions of this chapter are:
1. The use of symbolic execution prior to shipping the program
to discover which branches depend on input and which not.
2. An optimized approach to symbolic execution for bug repro-
duction that is guided by a symbolic branch log collected at
the user’s site.
3. The exploration of the tradeoffs between the amount of pre-
deployment symbolic execution, the instrumentation overhead
resulting from logging the outcome of branches, and the time
necessary to reproduce a bug at the developer’s site.
4. A combined static-dynamic method for deciding which branches
to instrument. The method leads to a better tradeoff than pre-
vious systems, making the approach of logging branches more
practical and reducing the debugging time.
5. A quantification of the impact of logging the result of selected
system calls, demonstrating that it only marginally increases
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the instrumentation overhead, but considerably shortens the
bug reproduction time.
Roadmap
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes
the program analysis and instrumentation methods we study. Sec-
tion 5.3 shows how we modify a symbolic execution engine to take
as input a partial branch recorded at the user site to reproduce a
bug. Section 5.4 describes some implementation details and our
experimental methodology. Section 5.5 presents the results for an
open-source Web server, diff, four coreutils programs, and two mi-
crobenchmarks. Section 5.6 discusses the results and our future
work. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Program Analysis and Instrumentation
Our approach involves analyzing the program to find the symbolic
branches and instrument them for logging. We study both dynamic
and static analyses. Our instrumentation may use the results of the
dynamic analysis only, those of the static analysis only, or combine
the results of both analyses. Next, we describe our analyses and
instrumentation methods.
Dynamic Analysis
Our dynamic analysis is based on symbolic execution. We mark
input to the program as symbolic and then use symbolic execution
to determine whether or not a branch condition depends on input.
Symbolic execution repeatedly and systematically explores all
paths (and thus branches) in a program. In the particular form
of symbolic execution used in this dissertation (sometimes called
concolic execution [51], see chapter 4), the symbolic engine executes
a number of runs of the program, each with a different concrete
input. Initially, it starts with a randomly chosen set of values for
the input and proceeds down the execution path of the program.
At each symbolic branch, it computes the branch condition for the
direction of the branch followed, and adds this condition to the
constraint set for this run. When the run terminates, the overall
constraint set describes the set of branch conditions that have to
be true for the program to follow the path that occurred in this
particular run. One of the conditions is then negated, the constraint
set is solved to obtain a new input, and a new run is started.
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We initially mark argv as symbolic, as well as the return values
of any functions that return input. During symbolic execution, we
track which variables depend on input variables, and mark those
as symbolic as well. When we execute a branch for the first time,
we label it symbolic if any of the variables on which the branch
condition depends is symbolic, and concrete otherwise. If during
further symbolic execution we revisit a branch labeled symbolic, it
stays that way. If, however, we revisit a branch labeled concrete, and
now its branch condition depends on at least one symbolic variable,
we relabel that branch as symbolic.
Symbolic execution tries to explore all program paths, and is
therefore very time-consuming. If it is able to explore all paths,
then all branches are visited, with some marked symbolic and some
marked concrete. However, this usually can only be done for very
small programs. For others, it is necessary to cut off symbolic execu-
tion after some amount of time. As a result, at the end of the anal-
ysis, in addition to branches labeled symbolic and concrete, some
branches remain unlabeled.
All branches marked symbolic are indeed symbolic, but some
branches marked concrete may actually be symbolic, because sym-
bolic execution was terminated before the branch was visited with
a condition depending on input. The unvisited branches may be
either symbolic or concrete.
Static Analysis
We use interprocedural, path-sensitive static analysis, in which we
use a combination of dataflow and points-to analysis. The basic
idea of the algorithm is to identify the sources of input (typically
I/O functions or arguments to the program), and construct a list
of variables whose values depend on input and are thus symbolic.
Symbolic branches are then identified as the branches whose condi-
tion depends on at least one symbolic variable.
The algorithm works by maintaining a queue of functions to an-
alyze. Initially, the queue only contains the main function. New
entries are queued in as function calls are discovered. The set of
symbolic variables is initialized to argv. In the initialization, the
functions that are normally used to read input are marked as re-
turning symbolic values.
Algorithms 1 and 2 show a simplified version of the algorithm
that analyzes each function. Each instruction in the program is vis-
ited, and the doInst method is called. The dataflow algorithm takes
care of loops by using a fixed-point algorithm so that instructions
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Algorithm 1: Static analysis algorithm propagating symbolic
information (simplified)
/* called on each instruction in the program as many
times as required by the fixed point dataflow
algorithm */
1 method doInstr(instruction i):;
2 begin
3 match i with begin
/* assignment */
4 case target variable = expression;
5 begin
/* If any of the variables referenced by
expression symbolic is symbolic mark
targe variable symbolic */
6 if isSymbolic(e) then
7 makeSymbolic(target variable);
8 end
9 end
/* function call */
10 case: target variable = fun name(parameters);
11 begin
12 symbolic params =
getSymbolicParameters(parameters);
/* If we already visited fun name with this
combination of symbolic parameters,
propagate symbolic flag */
13 if alreadyV isited(fun name, symbolic params) then
14 if returnsSymbolicMemory(fun name) then
15 makeSymbolic(target variable);
16 end
17 end
18 else
/* fun name not visited yet. Queue it and
stop analysis of current function. The
algorithm will return to this location
once fun name has been visited */
19 queueFunction(fun name, symbolic parameters,
i);
20 return abort
21 end
22 end
23 end
24 return continue
25 end
in a loop body are revisited (and doInst is called) only as long as
the algorithm output changes.
For an assignment instruction (i.e., an instruction of the form
variable = expression;), doInstr resolves the variables to which
the expression may be pointing, and checks whether any of these is
already known to be symbolic. If this is the case, it adds variable
to the list of symbolic variables, otherwise it continues. If the in-
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Algorithm 2: Static analysis algorithm identifying symbolic
branches (simplified)
/* called on each control flow statement of the program.
*/
1 method doStatement(statement s): begin
2 match s with;
3 begin
4 Branch(condition expression) begin
5 if isSymbolic(condition expression) then
6 logThisBranch();
7 end
8 end
9 end
10 return continue;
11 end
struction is a function call, the algorithm first checks whether the
function has already been analyzed or not. If it has, it looks up
the results to determine whether with the current set of parameters
the function can propagate symbolic memory or not, and updates
the list of symbolic variables accordingly. If the function has not
yet been visited 1, the algorithm enqueues it for analysis with a
reference to the current instruction, so that analysis of the current
function can resume when the function has been visited.
The doStatment method in algorithm 2 is called by the dataflow
framework on each control flow statement. For if statements, it re-
solves the list of variables to which the condition expression may be
pointing. If any of them is symbolic, the branch is labeled symbolic.
While the algorithm in Figure 1 is simplified for the sake of clar-
ity, our actual implementation handles the fact (1) that symbolic
variables can be propagated to global variables; (2) that the state
of global variables changes depending on the path that is being ana-
lyzed; and (3) that functions may propagate symbolic variables not
only to their return variables, but also to their parameters (passed
by reference) or to global variables.
Static analysis is imprecise because the points-to analysis tends
to over-estimate the set of aliases to which a variable may point.
As a result, all symbolic branches in the program are labeled sym-
bolic by the static analysis, but some concrete branches may also be
labeled symbolic. All branches labeled concrete are indeed concrete.
1More precisely, if the function has not been visited with the particular
combination of symbolic and concrete parameters encountered here.
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Program Instrumentation
The developer instruments the branches in the program before the
code is shipped. We consider four methods for instrumentation:
• dynamic instruments branches according to dynamic analysis.
• static instruments branches according to static analysis.
• dynamic+static instruments branches according to a combi-
nation of dynamic and static analysis.
• all branches instruments all branches.
Regardless of which method is used, the list of instrumented branches
is retained by the developer, because it is needed to reproduce the
bug (Section 5.3).
Dynamic method. After dynamic analysis, branches are labeled
symbolic or concrete, or remain unlabeled. The dynamic method
only instruments the branches labeled as symbolic. By the nature
of the dynamic analysis, we are certain that these branches are
symbolic. We do not instrument the branches labeled as concrete,
since application branches are typically either always symbolic or
always concrete. We also do not instrument the unlabeled branches.
The dynamic method thus potentially underestimates the number of
branches that need to be instrumented. In essence, dynamic favors
reducing instrumentation overhead at the expense of increased bug
reproduction time.
Static method. After static analysis, branches are labeled sym-
bolic or concrete. We instrument the branches labeled as symbolic.
By the nature of static analysis, the static method guarantees that
all symbolic branches are instrumented, but it may instrument a
number of concrete branches as well. Static therefore favors bug
reproduction time at the expense of increased instrumentation over-
head.
Dynamic+static method. In the combined method, we run both
the static and the dynamic analysis, the latter for a limited time.
The dynamic analysis labels branches as symbolic or concrete, or
they may remain unlabeled. The static analysis labels branches
as symbolic or concrete. The combined method instruments the
branches (1) that are labeled symbolic by the dynamic analysis,
and (2) that are labeled symbolic by the static analysis, with the
exception of those labeled concrete by the dynamic analysis. In
other words, when a branch is not visited by dynamic analysis, we
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instrument it based on the outcome of the static analysis, because
this is the only information about this branch. When a branch is
visited by dynamic analysis, we instrument it based on the outcome
of this analysis. For branches labeled symbolic by dynamic analysis,
this is obvious as they are guaranteed to be symbolic and have been
labeled symbolic by static analysis as well. For branches labeled
concrete by dynamic analysis, this means that we potentially over-
ride the outcome of static analysis which may have labeled these
branches symbolic. The reasons for this decision are that (1) static
analysis may conservatively label concrete branches symbolic, due
to an imprecise points-to analysis, and (2) application branches are
typically always concrete or always symbolic, as mentioned above.
Dynamic+static may be imprecise in two ways. Symbolic branches
may or may not be instrumented. The latter case occurs if they are
left concrete by the symbolic execution (for instance, due to the lim-
ited coverage of the symbolic execution). Concrete branches may or
may not be instrumented. The former case occurs when the static
analysis mistakenly labels them as symbolic and they are not visited
during symbolic execution.
Although seemingly suffering from a greater degree of impreci-
sion than the other methods, our evaluation shows that this method
actually leads to the best tradeoff between instrumentation overhead
and time necessary to reproduce the bug.
Logging system calls. In addition to deciding which branches to
instrument, we also consider the choice of whether or not to log the
results of certain system calls. Doing so adds to the runtime over-
head, but can be very beneficial for system calls that can produce
a large number of possible outcomes during replay. For example,
consider a select() system call for reading from any of N file descrip-
tors. Without information about which descriptors became ready
and when, symbolic execution during replay would have to explore
all combinations of N available descriptors upon each return from
select(). To avoid having to explore all possible combinations, we
instrument the code to log the descriptors that are available when
a call to select() returns. During replay, we simply re-create these
conditions. For the same reasons, it makes sense to instrument calls
to read to log the number of bytes read.
We log the results of all system calls for which logging consider-
ably simplifies replay, including select() and read(). The input data
itself is never logged. In principle, all instrumentation methods can
be combined with logging system calls.
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5.3 Reproducing a Bug
Replay Algorithm
We use Oasis (see chapter 4 to reproduce bugs. The following in-
formation is available to the engine prior to bug reproduction: a
list of all instrumented branches (saved when the program was in-
strumented – see Section 11), and the bitvector indicating which
way the instrumented branches were taken (one bit for each in-
strumented branch taken during execution at the user site). When
the symbolic execution engine encounters a branch, it immediately
knows whether or not the branch is symbolic, because it can check
whether the branch condition depends on the input.
We refer to a run of the symbolic execution engine as the exe-
cution of the engine with a single set of inputs, until it either finds
the path to the bug or aborts. A run is aborted when the engine
discovers that it is on a path that deviates from the path described
by the received bitvector. Each run is started with the bitvector
as received from the user site. A constraint set is associated with
each run, describing the path followed by the run through the pro-
gram, and consisting of the conjunction of the conditions for the
branch directions taken so far in the run. To later explore alterna-
tive paths should the current run abort, the engine also maintains
a list of pending constraint sets, describing these alternative unex-
plored paths.
The engine performs a number of these runs. The initial run is
done with random inputs. Subsequent runs use an input resulting
from the solution of a constraint set by the constraint solver. For
example, in Listing 5.1, the set of constraints: {not (option ==
’a’); option == ’b’} needs to be solved to take the program in the
else if branch at line 6. When visiting the else if branch at line
6, the engine puts in the pending list the following constraint set:
{not (option == ’a’); not (option == ’b’)}.
During a run, the engine proceeds normally for instructions other
than branches. For branches, because of the imprecision of the
decision of which branches to instrument, the following four cases
have to be distinguished.
1. The branch is symbolic and not instrumented. The
constraint for the particular direction of the branch taken is
added to the constraint set for the run, and symbolic execution
proceeds. In addition, a new constraint set is formed by adding
the negated constraint to the constraint set for the run. The
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new constraint set is put on the list of pending constraint sets.
The bitvector is left untouched.
2. The branch is symbolic and instrumented: The engine
takes the next bit out of the bitvector, and compares the direc-
tion that was taken during recorded execution to the direction
the symbolic execution would take with its input.
a) If the two are the same, the constraint is added to the
constraint set for the run, and the symbolic execution
proceeds.
b) If not, the constraint implied by the direction of the
branch taken during recorded execution is negated and
added to the constraint set for the run. This constraint
set is added to the list of pending constraint sets, and
the run aborts.
3. The branch is concrete and instrumented: The engine
takes the next bit out of the bitvector, and compares if the
direction that was taken during recorded execution is the same
as the direction the symbolic execution would take with the
current input.
a) If yes, it proceeds further.
b) If not, this run of the symbolic execution is aborted.
The latter case can only occur as a result of the run earlier
having taken the wrong direction on a branch that (because of
insufficient instrumentation) was not instrumented but should
have been.
4. The branch is concrete and not instrumented: The
engine proceeds. The bitvector is left untouched.
When a run is aborted, the engine looks at the pending list of
constraint sets, picks one, solves it, and starts another run with
the input resulting from the solver. When this new run passes the
branch at which it was produced, the new input, by construction,
causes the symbolic execution to take the direction opposite from
the one followed in the run during which the constraint set was
produced.
Replay Under Different Instrumentation Methods
The all branches instrumentation method instruments all symbolic
branches (and all concrete ones as well). Thus, cases 1 and 4 above
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cannot occur with this method. Furthermore, case 3(b) cannot oc-
cur either. The reason is that the engine always proceeds past a
symbolic branch in the same direction as recorded during execu-
tion. When the run hits a concrete branch, since this branch does
not depend on input, the engine is bound to follow the correct di-
rection.
The static method also instruments all symbolic branches, since
imprecision in the points-to analysis is resolved conservatively (if
a pointer might depend on input, it is flagged symbolic). Under
this method, cases 1 and 3(b) cannot occur. The latter case cannot
occur for the same reason above.
The dynamic method may not instrument all symbolic branches,
because it may not run long enough to find them. Similarly, the dy-
namic+static method may fail to instrument all symbolic branches,
but only when symbolic execution does not run long enough and
static analysis is inaccurate. In these cases, a run can take the
wrong direction at a symbolic branch that was not instrumented,
and later hit a concrete branch for which the input fails to satisfy
the branch condition. In this case, the engine needs to back up and
explore an alternative direction at a symbolic but uninstrumented
branch. The constraint sets for these alternative directions reside
on the pending list. The search can use any heuristic for deciding
which constraint set to pick from the pending list. We currently use
a simple depth-first approach.
Replaying System Calls
As mentioned in Section 11, we consider scenarios with and without
instrumentation for logging the results of certain system calls.
When these system calls are not logged, we replay them using
models of their behavior. The models use symbolic variables to
allow the engine to reproduce any behavior that may be produced
by the kernel. For instance, for the read() system call, we use a
symbolic variable for the return value that determines how much
input is read. This symbolic variable is constrained to be between
−1 and the amount of input requested. During replay, a program
executing the read() call initially returns the amount of (symbolic)
input requested, and execution carries on. Because the return value
of the system call is symbolic, if the program checks it in a branch
and if the branch has been logged, the log specifies which direction
needs to be taken. If that direction fails, the symbolic execution
engine aborts the run. Eventually, the number of bytes actually
read at the user’s site is found.
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When these system calls are logged, we replay their execution
based on the logs. During replay, the calls for which there are logged
results always return exactly the recorded value. Thus, the symbolic
execution engine need not search for the actual call results.
5.4 Implementation and Methodology
Software. For program instrumentation and analysis, we use CIL
(C Intermediate Language [42]), which is a collection of tools that
allow simple analysis and modification of C code.
For static analysis we start by merging all the source code files
of the program in one large C file. This allows us to run the analysis
on the whole program, making the results more accurate. We then
use two CIL plug-ins for the dataflow and points-to analysis.
For symbolic execution, we use Oasis, our home-grown concolic
execution engine for C programs described in chapter 4. The engine
instruments the C program and links it with a runtime library for
logging constraints.
We also use CIL to instrument the branches in the program. The
instrumentation simply uses a bit per branch in a large buffer, and
flushes the buffer to disk when it is full. We use a buffer of 4KB in
order to avoid writing to disk too often. We do not use any form of
online compression, as this would impose additional CPU overhead.
Moreover, we could have used a simple branch prediction algorithm
to avoid logging all instrumented branches, but this would have
required recording the program location for each logged branch.
This approach would have required at least another 32 bits of storage
per branch, probably ruining any savings obtained by the prediction
algorithm.
Benchmarks. We first evaluate the instrumentation overhead in
isolation using two microbenchmarks. Next, we reproduce real bugs
previously reported in the coreutils programs [10]. Then, we evalu-
ate the tradeoff between instrumentation overhead and bug repro-
duction time using an open-source Web server, the uServer [45].
The uServer was designed for conducting performance experiments
related to Internet service and operating system design and im-
plementation. We use version 0.6.0, which has approximately 32K
lines of code. In our final experiment, we again evaluate the tradeoff
between instrumentation overhead and bug reproduction, but this
time with the diff utility. Diff is an input-intensive application that
pinpoints the differences between two files provided as input. It
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contains about 22K lines of code. For all experiments we link the
programs with the uClibc library [55].
We study five configurations of each benchmark: four result-
ing from our four instrumentation methods plus a configuration
called none, which involves no instrumentation. For the instru-
mented benchmarks, unless mentioned otherwise, selective system
call logging is turned on.
Hardware. Our experimental setup consists of two machines with
two quad-core 2.27-GHz Xeon CPUs, 24 GBytes of memory, and a
160-GByte 7200rpm hard disk drive.
5.5 Evaluation
Microbenchmarks
We evaluate the cost of the instrumentation by using two simple
microbenchmarks. The first microbenchmark comprises a loop that
increments a counter 1 billion times. The loop condition (checking
the loop bound) consists of a single branch, executing as many times
as there are iterations.
We compare the none (no instrumentation) and all branches ver-
sions of this microbenchmark using the Linux perf profiler. The
results show that the branch logging instrumentation takes 17 in-
structions on average, including the periodic flushing of the log to
disk. In terms of running time, we see an average cost of 3 nanosec-
onds per instrumented branch (with an average of 2.1 instructions
per cycle), for a total overhead of 107%. While considerable, this
overhead is still lower than that reported in ODR [1] (about 200%
just for the branch recording). The most likely reason is that our
instrumentation only logs one bit per branch, while ODR uses a
more complicated branch prediction algorithm.
We run a second microbenchmark consisting of the example in
Listing 5.1, which computes the fibonacci sequence for one of two
numbers. We instrument this program using the four configura-
tions of our system. Not surprisingly, the configurations other than
all branches instrument only the symbolic branches corresponding
to lines 4 and 6. The results are consistent with our previous mi-
crobenchmark: an average overhead of 17 instructions per instru-
mented branch or about 3 nanoseconds. The all branches configura-
tion suffers from a total overhead of 110%, whereas the three others
do not incur any noticeable overhead because only two branches are
logged.
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Coreutils
We now evaluate our approaches using four real bugs in different
programs from the Unix coreutils set: mkdir, mknod, mkfifo, and
paste. We ran the programs with up to 10 arguments, each 100
bytes long.
Branch behavior. Recall that our approach is based on two
assumptions about branches: (1) that there are many (concrete)
branches whose outcomes do not depend on input, and (2) that if
a branch is executed once with a concrete (symbolic) branch con-
dition, it is most likely always executed with a concrete (symbolic)
condition.
To check these assumptions, we modify our symbolic execution
engine to run with concrete inputs (instead of generating concrete
inputs itself to explore different paths). In addition, at each exe-
cuted branch, we record whether it is executed with a symbolic or
a concrete branch condition.
We show the results of a sample run of mkdir in Figure 5.1;
the graphs for the other 3 programs are similar. The figure shows
per-branch-location statistics for this experiment. We use the term
“branch location” to mean the location of a branch in the source
code, and “branch execution” to mean the actual execution of a
branch location during run time. Each point on the x axis denotes
a branch location that is executed at least once. The y axis shows
how many times each branch is executed. The gray bars denote the
overall number of branch executions, whereas the black bars denote
the number of executions with a symbolic condition. The black bars
are therefore a subset of the gray bars.
As the figure illustrates, only a limited number of branch loca-
tions is responsible for all the symbolic branch executions. Further-
more, where black bars are present, they completely cover the gray
bars. This shows that a particular branch is executed either always
with concrete conditions or always with symbolic conditions. These
observations support our two assumptions.
Instrumentation overhead. Figure 5.2 shows the CPU time as-
sociated with the instrumentation for mkdir (again, the results
for the other programs are similar). Those results are obtained
by running the program in the symbolic execution engine for one
hour. The figure shows that the time is almost identical for the
dynamic, dynamic+static, and static configurations. The static and
dynamic analyses produce accurate results in those programs. The
all branches configuration is the slowest, with an overhead of 31%.
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30 All branches
Symbolic branches
Figure 5.1: Number of executions of each branch in a sample run
of mkdir. The overlaid black bars represent the branches executed
with symbolic conditions.
dynamic
dynamic+static
static
all branches
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
cpu time (%)
Figure 5.2: CPU time of mkdir instrumented with the four con-
figurations of our system. Results are normalized to the non-
instrumented version.
Reproducing bugs. Each program suffers a crash bug that only
manifest itself when a very specific combination of arguments is
used. For instance, the bug in paste occurs with the following com-
mand line:
paste -d\\ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
Table 5.1 shows the time needed to reproduce the crash bugs in
the four programs. The programs being relatively small, symbolic
execution is able to cover most of the important branches in a very
short amount of time, and static analysis produces accurate results.
Thus, we can reproduce the bug in less than two seconds in all of
the four instrumented configurations.
These bugs have also been used to evaluate ESD [58]. Interest-
ingly, ESD took significantly more time to reproduce the bugs (be-
tween 10 and 15 seconds, albeit with no runtime overhead). This can
be attributed to the fact that our system essentially knows the exact
80
Chapter 5: Bug Reporting
Program Replay time
mkdir 1 sec
mknod 1 sec
mkfifo 1 sec
paste 1.5 sec
Table 5.1: Time needed to replay a real bug in four coreutils pro-
grams. The results are the same with all four configurations of our
system.
1
10
100
1000
10000
100000
1000000 All branches
Symbolic branches
branches located in the uClibc code branches located in the uServer code
Figure 5.3: Number of executions of each branch location in a sam-
ple run of the uServer. The y axis is in log scale.
path to the bug (during bug reproduction), whereas ESD needs to
search many paths.
uServer
We further evaluate our system using a much larger application (32K
lines of code), the uServer [45], an open-source Web server some-
times used for performance studies. Unlike the coreutils programs,
which are very small, this benchmark elucidates the differences be-
tween the approaches for deciding which branches to instrument,
and the tradeoff between instrumentation overhead and bug repro-
duction time.
Branch behavior. We run the uServer in our modified symbolic
execution environment with 5,000 HTTP requests to demonstrate
the nature of the branches (symbolic or concrete). In total, ap-
proximately 18 million branches are executed, out of which only 1.8
million or roughly 10% are symbolic. These 1.8 million symbolic
branches correspond to multiple executions of the same 53 branch
locations in the program.
Figure 5.3 shows per-branch-location statistics for this experi-
ment. As we can see, most of the black bars entirely cover their
corresponding gray bars. This means that these particular branch
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Version
LC HC
dynamic 78 246
dynamic + static 1654 1490
static
all branches
2104
5104
# of instrumented branch
locations
Table 5.2: Number of branch locations instrumented in the uServer
with the different configurations of our system.
locations are executed either always with concrete conditions, or al-
ways with symbolic conditions. However, the situation is slightly
different for the branches in uClibc, where in some cases the black
bars almost but not completely cover the gray bars. This situation
corresponds to library functions that are sometimes called with con-
crete values. In this experiment, the number of those cases was very
small.
The figure also shows that most branches are executed in the
library (81%). However, only 28% of the symbolic branches are
executed in the library.
Identifying symbolic branch locations. In total, there are 5104
branch locations in the uServer code (and 8516 in uClibc).
Table 5.2 shows the number of instrumented branches in the
uServer for each configuration of our system. We symbolically ex-
ecute the uServer using 200 bytes of symbolic memory for each
accepted connection, and for each file descriptor. We stop the sym-
bolic execution phase after one hour and two hours, obtaining a
coverage of 20% (denoted LC for lower coverage) and 33% (HC for
higher coverage), respectively. Running longer does not significantly
improve branch coverage.
Out of a total of 5104 branches, static marks 2104 as symbolic,
dynamic 246, and dynamic+static 1490, in the HC configuration. In
addition, with dynamic, 1434 branches are marked as concrete, and
the remaining branches are not visited.
For the static analysis tool, we need to merge all the source
files of both the application and the library. Unfortunately, doing
so resulted in a file too large for the points-to analysis to handle.2
Therefore we perform static analysis only on the uServer application
code. All branches in the library are treated as symbolic by the
static analysis.
2After six hours, the analysis had made little progress and we aborted it.
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dynamic (lc)
dynamic (hc)
dynamic+static (lc)
dynamic+static (hc)
static
all branches
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450
dynamic (lc)
dynamic (hc)
dynamic+static (lc)
dynamic+static (hc)
static
all branches
0 100 200 300 400 500
cpu time (%) storage (bytes)
Figure 5.4: CPU time of the uServer instrumented with the four
configurations of our system.
dynamic (lc)
dynamic (hc)
dynamic+static (lc)
dynamic+static (hc)
static
all branches
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dynamic (lc)
dynamic (hc)
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static
all branches
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Figure 5.5: CPU time (a) and storage requirement (b) of the uServer
instrumented with the four configurations of our system.
With less coverage, there are more branches left unvisited, and
therefore more opportunity for the static phase to mark them sym-
bolic. This is why there are fewer instrumented branches in the dy-
namic configuration and more in the dynamic+static configuration.
Those numbers are used to highlight the effect of branch coverage
in our approach.
Instrumentation overhead. We use the httperf [36] benchmark-
ing tool to compare the performance of the configurations for the
uServer. We run httperf with a static workload saturating the CPU
core on which the uServer is running. We consider three perfor-
mance metrics: number of instrumented branches executed, CPU
time, and storage requirement of the instrumentation. All three are
roughly proportional to each other.
Figure 5.4 shows CPU time (relative to the non-instrumented
version). As we can see, the overhead of all branches is significant.
The results of static are only marginally better, since it instruments
all branches in the uClibc library.
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The two configurations using dynamic analysis perform notably
better. The overhead is 17% and 20%, respectively, for the dy-
namic and dynamic+static configurations. This is not surprising
for dynamic, as it instruments only 284 branch locations. The
dynamic+static configuration instruments many more branch loca-
tions, but still far fewer than all or static.
The coverage obtained with symbolic execution affects the in-
strumentation overhead of dynamic and dynamic+static. Increased
coverage increases the overhead of dynamic, since symbolic execu-
tion instruments more branches. In contrast, increased coverage
leads to reduced instrumentation in dynamic+static, corresponding
to branches marked symbolic by the static analysis, left unvisited
by the dynamic analysis with low coverage, and marked concrete by
the dynamic analysis with high coverage.
Figure 5.5 shows the storage requirements per HTTP request
processed by the Web server. The storage overhead is reasonable;
around 50 bytes per request in the dynamic and dynamic+static
configurations. This is roughly the same number of bytes in a typical
entry in the access log of the Web server.
Both the processing and storage overheads are more significant
in the static and all branches configurations. These configurations
represent worst-case scenarios for the areas of the code that are not
covered by the symbolic execution.
When a bug occurs, the branch log has to be transferred to the
developer. Compression can be used to reduce the transfer time.
We observe a compression ratio of 10-20x using gzip. In Section
5.6, we discuss how to deal with long-running executions, which
could generate extremely large branch logs.
Reproducing bugs. To evaluate the amount of effort required to
reproduce a bug, we run the uServer with five different input scenar-
ios. To demonstrate the impact of code coverage on our approach,
we design those scenarios to hit different code areas of the HTTP
parser. More specifically, we use HTTP queries of various lengths
(between 5 to 400 bytes), with different HTTP methods (e.g., GET,
POST) and parameters (e.g., Cookies, Content-Length). We crash
the server by sending it a SEGFAULT signal after sending it the
input, making sure it crashes at the same location in the code for
all four versions. After replay, we verify that each configuration
produced input that correctly leads to the same location.
Table 5.3 shows the bug reproduction times for all four instru-
mented versions of the five scenarios. Table 5.4 shows the cor-
responding number of symbolic branch locations logged and not
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Version
LC
HC
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HC
dynamic
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18 / 112
0
0
dynamic+static
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18 / 112
0
0
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all branches
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25 / 129913
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11 / 23062
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3 / 110
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all branches
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25 / 554617
42 / 28848
17 / 48485
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all branches
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logged, as well as the number of actual symbolic branch executions.
Both tables include the configuration with low coverage (LC) and
high coverage (HC).
Unsurprisingly, the all branches and static versions, which instru-
ment all symbolic branches, perform best. Of course, these versions
do so at high runtime and storage overheads (Figures 5.4 and 5.5).
Dynamic+static in most cases performs only slightly worse than
static, despite the much lower instrumentation overhead of the for-
mer configuration. Dynamic comes last, with many LC experiments
not finishing in one hour. This is not surprising, as the number of
branches identified as symbolic, and therefore the amount of log-
ging, is very low. In fact, Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show that the number
of symbolic branch locations not logged is well correlated with the
replay time. As soon as replay encounters more than a dozen sym-
bolic branch locations that are not instrumented, the replay time
exceeds one hour. An approach that does not instrument the code
at all, would result in even longer bug reproduction times.
Dynamic+static obtains similar results regardless of coverage.
The reason is that symbolic execution may incorrectly classify some
branches as concrete, and thus slow down the search. When run-
ning longer, those branches may later be marked symbolic, there-
fore correcting the error. In our experiment, those differences have
a marginal effect on dynamic+static, which again suggests that this
does not happen frequently.
Impact of logging system calls. By default, we log the results
for some key system calls (Section 11). For instance, we log the
return value of the read() system call and the order of ready file
descriptors from select() calls.
The measurements in Figures 5.4 and 5.5 include the overhead
of logging these return values. As we only log a limited number of
values for a few system calls, logging these values introduces little
extra work compared to the logging of the branches. As a result,
when not logging system call results, the overhead is reduced by a
marginal 0.2%.
Tables 5.5 and 5.8 present the bug reproduction times of two of
our experiments without logging any system calls (we omit the three
other experiments for brevity; their results are similar). All config-
urations of our system take significantly longer to replay, as the
symbolic execution engine needs to determine the exact return val-
ues of the selected system calls. The dynamic and dynamic+static
configurations are further penalized, since the back-tracking needed
by the unlogged symbolic branches compounds the search for the re-
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Version
LC HC LC HC LC HC LC HC LC HC
dynamic 27s 27s 2877s 79s ! 170s ! 287s ! 168s
dynamic+static 27s 27s 79s 79s 532s 170s 175s 175s 248s 168s
static
all branches
Version
LC HC LC HC
dynamic 112s 112s ! 712s
dynamic+static 112s 112s 991s 694s
static
all branches
Exp. 1 Exp. 4
87s 362s
56s 343s
175s
175s
168s
168s
27s
27s
79s
79s
170s
170s
Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 5
Table 5.5: Time in seconds needed to reproduce two input scenarios
with the uServer when not logging system call results. The infinity
symbol means that the experiment did not terminate in one hour.
dynamic
dynamic+static
static
all branches
0 50 100 150 200
cpu time (%)
Figure 5.6: CPU time of diff instrumented with the four configura-
tions of our system. Results are normalized to the non-instrumented
version.
turn values. Interestingly, the static configuration performs slightly
slower than all branches, whereas when logging system calls it per-
forms identically. The reason is that fewer concrete branches are
logged, therefore the engine takes slightly more time to realize a
wrong turn due to a system call.
Diff
We now consider the diff utility. Diff is more challenging than the
uServer for our dynamic analysis, as its behavior depends more
heavily on input. Moreover, diff generates very long constraint sets,
placing a heavy burden on the constraint solver. For these reasons,
dynamic analysis attains a coverage of only 20% of branches, during
1 hour of symbolic execution. In total, there are 8840 branches in
the program. dynamic identifies 440 of them as being symbolic,
static 4292, and dynamic+static 3432.
Instrumentation overheads. We run diff on two sample text
files. Figure 5.6 shows the CPU time of the four configurations
of our system, normalized against the non-instrumented execution.
Consistent with our prior results, dynamic and dynamic+static per-
form best with an overhead of approximately 35%.
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Version Exp. 1 Exp. 2
dynamic ! !
dynamic + static 1s 12s
static 1s 12s
all branches 1s 12s
Table 5.6: Time in seconds needed to reproduce two input scenarios
to diff. The infinity symbol means that the experiment did not
terminate in one hour.
Version symbolic branch
locations logged /
corresponding 
executions
symbolic branch
locations NOT
logged / 
corresponding 
executions
dynamic 3 / 2125686 32 / 2369765
dyn.+static 13 / 904 0
static 13 / 904 0
all branches 13 / 904 0
dynamic 3 / 2478280 24 / 2102506
dyn.+static 21 / 54623 0
static 21 / 54623 0
all branches 21 / 54623 0
Ex
p. 
1
Ex
p. 
2
Table 5.7: Number of symbolic branch locations and symbolic
branch executions logged and not logged for two input scenarios
to diff.
Reproducing bugs. We replay two executions of diff comparing
relatively small but different text files. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 list the
results of these experiments. Because the coverage obtained dur-
ing dynamic analysis is relatively low, the dynamic configuration
is unable to finish the experiments in 1 hour. The few tens of un-
logged symbolic branch locations quickly create a very large number
of paths to explore, making it impossible for this approach to finish
within the allotted time. In contrast, the three other configurations,
and in particular dynamic+static, do not suffer from any unlogged
symbolic branches and therefore replay quickly.
Collectively, these results again demonstrate that dynamic+static
strikes the best balance between instrumentation overhead and bug
reproduction time.
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5.6 Discussion and Future Work
Branch coverage. Our current results suggest that using a branch
trace, even partial, is effective at reducing the amount of searching
needed to reproduce a specific buggy execution path. To maintain
low instrumentation overhead, it is necessary to obtain sufficient
coverage with the initial symbolic execution phase. This problem
has received attention in the literature ([10, 26]), and significant
progress has been made in recent years. In chapter 4 we describe
our own efforts to improve the coverage of upgraded code. While it
is not always possible to achieve 100% coverage, this is a typical goal
when testing an application prior to shipping. Therefore, the testing
effort can be leveraged to identify the symbolic branches at the same
time. Moreover, manual test cases can be used in conjunction with
symbolic execution to boost code coverage, and many applications
already have test suites covering most of their codes.
Constraint solving. Symbolic execution is limited by the ability
to solve the resulting constraints. In particular, certain types of
programs generate constraints that current state of the art solvers
cannot solve. Constraint solving is an active research topic and our
approach should directly benefit from any advances in this field.
Non-determinism. Two approaches exist for dealing with non-
determinism, resulting, for instance, from system calls or random
number generators. One can either log the outcome of the non-
deterministic event or one can treat it as (symbolic) input during
replay. In this chapter, we strike a middle ground between these
approaches, logging the outcome of non-deterministic events that
are likely to cause a great deal of search during replay. The results
in Section 5.5 validate this approach, but a more comprehensive
treatment of non-deterministic events could be explored.
Multithreading. We can extend our system to support multi-
threaded applications by modifying it in two ways. First, the branch
trace needs to be split into multiple traces, one per thread. Sec-
ond, the ordering of thread execution needs to be recorded as well.
Implementing the first modification is trivial, and is unlikely to im-
pose any significant additional overhead. The second modification
is more difficult. Others [1, 58] have experimented with ideas for
recreating a suitable thread scheduling to find race conditions. Our
approach of logging a partial trace of branches is complementary to
those efforts and could considerably speed up the replay of multi-
threaded programs with races.
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Long-running applications. The storage overhead and replay
time of long-running applications can be problematic. Consider, for
example, the case of a Web server running for weeks before crashing.
Our current approach reduces storage overhead as much as possible,
but with these applications this overhead may still be high. Fur-
thermore, replaying such a long trace may be infeasible, as it will
be longer than the original run. Pushing the concept of a partial
branch trace further, our approach could be extended to simplify
this problem by implementing support for checkpointing. An in-
strumented application could periodically take a checkpoint of its
state and discard the current branch log. Logging branches would
then continue from the checkpoint only. The checkpoint would in-
clude enough information on the data structures of the program
(but not its content). With this information, a symbolic execution
engine can treat their content as symbolic, and replay the branch
log starting from there. We leave the implementation and the asso-
ciated research questions of the checkpointing mechanism for future
work.
Concolic vs. symbolic. The particular form of symbolic execu-
tion we use in this chapter is called concolic execution [51]. The main
difference from pure symbolic execution (as in [10], for instance) is
that the engine repeatedly executes the program from beginning to
end with concrete inputs, instead of exploring multiple paths in par-
allel. This implementation difference has no fundamental impact on
our system, as in both cases the engine can select the paths in the
same order. On one hand, the fact that the application is rerun from
the beginning for every path imposes some additional overhead. On
the other hand, because concrete inputs are always used, it makes
the work of the solver easier. In many instances, branch conditions
are already satisfied by the random input chosen. To the best of
our knowledge, no comparative studies of the impact of the different
implementations have been published yet.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we consider the problem of instrumenting programs
to reproduce bugs effectively, while keeping user data private. In
particular, we focus on the tradeoff between the instrumentation
overhead experienced by the user and the time it takes the developer
to reproduce a bug in the program.
We explore this tradeoff by studying approaches for selecting
a partial set of branches to log during the program’s execution in
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the field. Specifically, we propose to use static analysis (dataflow
and points-to analysis) and/or dynamic analysis (time-constrained
symbolic execution) to find the branches that depend on input. Our
instrumentation methods log only those branches to limit the instru-
mentation overhead. When a user encounters a bug, the developer
uses the partial branch log to drive a symbolic execution engine in
efficiently reproducing the bug.
Our results show that the instrumentation method that com-
bines static and dynamic analyses strikes the best compromise be-
tween instrumentation overhead and bug reproduction time. For
the programs we consider, this combined method reduces the in-
strumentation overhead by up to 92% (compared to using static
analysis only), while limiting the bug reproduction time (compared
to using dynamic analysis only).
We conclude that our characterization of this tradeoff and our
combined instrumentation method represent important steps in im-
proving bug reporting and optimizing symbolic execution for bug
reproduction.
93

Chapter 6
Related Work
6.1 Characterizing Upgrades
As far as we know, only two other works characterized upgrades.
Beattie et al. [5] tried to determine when it is best to apply security
patches. They built mathematical models of the factors affecting
when to patch, and collected empirical data to validate the model.
Relative to Mirage, the paper focused solely on security patches
and did not consider the benefits of user-machine testing or staged
deployment.
The study by Gkantsidis et al. [23] focused on the Windows en-
vironment and on the networking aspects of deploying upgrades.
Most importantly, the study did not consider several important is-
sues, including upgrade installation and testing, upgrade problems,
and problem reporting. Our survey addressed all of these issues.
6.2 Upgrade Deployment
Deployment Strategy
As far as we know, no previous work has considered staged upgrade
deployment. In fact, the two previous works on large-scale upgrade
deployment focused solely on (1) deploying upgrades as quickly as
possible to all users while reducing the load on the vendor’s site [23];
and (2) creating a deployment infrastructure that can be tailored by
explicit contracts between vendors and users [52]. In contrast to (1),
Mirage recognizes the tradeoff between the speed of deployment and
the likelihood of testing problems at the user machines. In contrast
to (2), Mirage does not consider contracts, since they are rare in
practice, especially in the open-source community.
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Commercial upgrade (patch) management systems and tools,
e.g., [32, 47], deploy upgrades within enterprises. They typically
concentrate on discovering machines on the enterprise’s network, as-
sessing which upgrades are needed, and applying the patches while
minimizing the number of reboots. Some providers, such as [47],
manually collect upgrades from vendors and test them locally be-
fore sending them to their customer enterprises. Relative to Mirage,
these upgrade-management systems do not help individual users and
have no automatic support for testing upgrades after they are ap-
plied to the machines in the enterprise. Nevertheless, the providers
that manually test upgrades do produce a primitive form of staging
for enterprises. However, they are unlike representatives (or beta
testers), since they have no relationship to the vendor. In fact,
their existence does not change the fact that vendors deploy their
upgrades to the entire world as a single huge cluster.
Clustering Machines
The Pastiche [17] peer-to-peer backup system builds a structured
overlay by replacing the proximity metric with a measure of simi-
larity between sets of neighbors’ files. Although Pastiche does not
explicitly cluster machines, one could envisage Pastiche being used
to perform distributed clustering based on the list of environmental
resources at each machine.
Others have considered surviving Internet catastrophes by back-
ing up data on dissimilar hosts. This problem roughly corresponds
to the problem of recovering from a globally-deployed problematic
upgrade. In Phoenix [31], Junqueira et al. observe that backups
should be done on hosts that do not share the same potential vulner-
abilities. Interestingly, the clustering of dissimilar hosts in Phoenix
has the opposite goal to our clusters, which cluster similar hosts.
Furthermore, Mirage clusters machines based on different charac-
teristics than Phoenix.
Integrating Deployment, Testing, and Reporting
At a high-level, the most similar work to Mirage is a position paper
by Cook and Orso [14], which also proposes to integrate upgrade
deployment, user-machine testing (via white-box approaches), and
problem reporting back to developers. However, they did not con-
sider staged deployment or any type of clustering. Furthermore,
they did not attempt to characterize upgrades or evaluate their pro-
posed system.
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6.3 Testing
Static Analysis and Model Checking
Static analysis [4, 6] can automatically check a number of useful
properties in the code, but it can miss many important problems.
Moreover, it may generate many unnecessary warnings.
Model checking of implementations [38, 37, 57] can be used to
find bugs in a systematic fashion. However, symbolic execution
overcomes the need for creating special testing harnesses that are
needed for model checking.
Testing and Dynamic Analysis
Testing plays an important role in ensuring the overall quality of the
software, because it aims to detect errors in program logic, check
boundary values, and provide high code coverage. However, it is
very hard to achieve good coverage in practice, as it requires careful
choice of inputs. Oasis uses concolic execution to generate input,
and implements a new heuristic to optimize the coverage of new or
affected code when regression testing.
Dynamic analysis tools (such as Valgrind [43]) can provide valu-
able help to detect bugs during testing. Unfortunately, they detect
bugs only on the paths on which they are executed. PathExpander
[34] improves path coverage of such tools by selectively executing
non-taken paths in a sandbox.
In contrast, Oasis uses dynamic analysis to detect bugs, and
concolic execution to improve coverage of the test cases.
Symbolic and Concolic Execution
There has been a large body of work on using symbolic and concolic
execution for automated test generation [7, 8, 11, 10, 16, 15, 19, 25,
27, 26, 35, 49, 51, 9].
Most of the work in this area tries to address the two main
problems of symbolic execution: dealing with the environment [11,
10] and path explosion [7, 11, 10, 19, 25, 35]. Most recently, KLEE
[10] uses environment modeling, and aggressive constraint caching
and search heuristics to deal with these two problems, respectively.
As a result, KLEE has been successful in identifying bugs in heavily
debugged code. Similar to previous works, Oasis provides models for
system calls. To address the problem of path explosion, Oasis relies
on search heuristics, and proposes interactive symbolic execution as
a way to advance the state of the art in this area.
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Other symbolic and concolic execution engines [10, 9] implement
path exploration heuristics that try to drive the program into parts
of the code that have not been explored yet. They typically use a
statically computed control flow graph and use it to try to follow
branches that are more likely to drive the application to yet unex-
plored parts of the code. Oasis builds on those ideas and extends
them by analyzing the source code to pinpoint the new code in up-
grades, and tracks the effect of this new code on the rest of the code
at runtime.
Existing approaches to concolic execution, e.g., DART [27], can
use random inputs to drive code execution along any given path.
However, random inputs have low probability of passing through a
series of input validation checks that typically exist in software. In
contrast, Oasis uses any valid inputs to pass through these checks
and quickly start exploring deep code paths.
Symbolic Java PathFinder [49] uses system-level concrete exe-
cution to reach a unit of code, and then uses unit-level symbolic
execution. In contrast with this work, Oasis does not require man-
ual validation of potentially erroneous inputs (that are the result of
isolated unit testing).
Finally, relative to the existing body of work on symbolic and
concolic execution, Oasis leverages the differences in the code to
more quickly explore paths leading to the new or changed code.
Doing so reduces the time needed for regression testing, for example
in the case of software upgrades.
6.4 Bug Reporting
At one end of the spectrum between instrumentation overhead and
bug reproduction effort are record-replay systems that try to capture
the interactions between the program and its environment. Different
systems capture interactions at different levels. Most systems cap-
ture them at the system call or library level. For example, ReVirt
[18] logs interactions at the virtual machine level. All record-replay
systems suffer from the overhead of logging the interactions. To
reduce this overhead, R2 [29] asks the developer to manually spec-
ify at what interfaces to capture the program’s interactions with its
environment.
At the other end of the spectrum are conventional bug reporting
systems, which provide a coredump, but no indication of how the
program arrived at the buggy state. Obviously, there is no recording
overhead, but it takes considerable manual search to find out how
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the problem came about.
ESD (Execution Synthesis Debugger [58]) is an attempt to au-
tomate some of that search. It tries to do so without recording
any information about the program execution. Instead, it uses the
stack trace at the time of the program crash, and symbolically exe-
cutes the program to find the path to the bug location. Although it
uses static analysis and other optimizations to reduce the number of
paths it needs to explore, it remains fundamentally limited by the
exponential path explosion of symbolic execution. Our approach
instead performs logging of a set of judiciously chosen branches.
This allows us to speed up the automated search with limited run-
time overhead. As our results with the coreutils show, our methods
reproduce bugs faster, albeit at some modest cost in runtime.
BBR (Better Bug Reporting, [12]) investigates the same tradeoff,
although more from the perspective of maintaining privacy when a
bug is reported to the developer. During execution it logs the pro-
gram’s inputs. After a crash, it replays the entire execution on the
user machine based on those inputs. Replay uses an instrumented
version of the program that collects the constraints implied by the
direction of the branches taken in the program. An input set that
satisfies these constraints is then returned to the developer. Unlike
BBR, we do not log the users’ inputs, or require whole-program re-
play and the execution of a constraint solver on the user machine.
Instead, we incur limited logging overhead at the user site and some
exploration of alternative paths at the developer site.
Another approach for maintaining privacy is explored by the
Panalyst system [56]. After a runtime error, the user initially re-
ports only public information. The developer tries to exploit this
information using symbolic execution, but can query the user for
additional information. The user can choose whether or not to re-
spond to the developer queries. In the limit, Panalyst’s effectiveness
is constrained by the exponential cost of symbolic execution.
Triage [54] explores yet another way of debugging errors at user
sites. It periodically checkpoints programs, and after a failure, it
restarts the program from a checkpoint. Heavyweight instrumenta-
tion, exploration of alternatives (delta-debugging), and speculative
execution may be used during replay. Some applications were suc-
cessfully debugged using this approach, but the checkpoint may have
to be far back in time to allow meaningful exploration.
The same tradeoff between instrumentation overhead and bug
reproduction time has also been explored for debugging multithreaded
programs. To faithfully replay the execution of a thread, the shared
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memory interactions with other threads need to be logged. The
cost of doing so is very high, and therefore the PRES [46] debugger
selectively omits logging certain interactions, but requires multiple
replay runs before it can recreate a path to a bug. Similarly, in
order to avoid logging all shared memory accesses, ODR [1] allows
some degree of inconsistency between the actual execution and the
replay, provided that the inconsistencies do not affect the output
of the program. The techniques used by PRES and ODR could
be combined with partial logging of branches as presented in this
paper.
Logging of branches has been used to report a program’s behav-
ior before a bug in Traceback [3]. The system uses this behavior to
reconstruct the control flow leading to the problem. To reduce the
instrumentation overhead, Traceback uses static analysis to mini-
mize the number of instructions required to instrument branches,
and only logs the most recent branches. Our system goes further
by combining dynamic and static analyses to reduce the number of
instrumented branches, and reproducing the entire path to the bug.
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Conclusion
In this dissertation, we study the problem of improving the qual-
ity and reliability of software upgrades, and reduce the impact of
problems.
We motivate our work using a survey of system administrators.
The results confirm that upgrades are done frequently, that prob-
lems are quite common, that these problems can cause severe dis-
ruption and that therefore upgrades are often delayed, and that
users seldom fully report the problems to the vendor.
To improve on the current situation, we argue the necessity to
revise the entire software upgrade process. To this end, we present
Mirage, a framework that integrates testing, deployment and bug
reporting in an integrated system.
Mirage’s deployment subsystem allows the vendor to deploy its
upgrades in stages over clusters of users sharing similar environ-
ments. Our evaluation demonstrates that our clustering algorithm
achieves its goal of separating machines with dissimilar environ-
ments in different clusters, while not creating an impractically large
number of clusters. A simulation study of two staged deployment
protocols demonstrates that staging significantly reduces upgrade
overhead, while still achieving low deployment latency. Further-
more, a suitable choice of protocol allows a vendor to achieve differ-
ent objectives.
Oasis, the testing subsystem of Mirage, improves on current
state-of-the-art concolic and symbolic engines by implementing an
new heuristic to prioritize the exploration of new or affected code
in the upgrade. Furthermore, we propose interactive symbolic ex-
ecution, a new approach exposing the problem of path exploration
to the tester using a graphical user interface. The tester can use
interactive symbolic execution as a learning tool to develop new
heuristics or as a complement to existing heuristics to manually
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influence the exploration and steer it towards interesting areas of
the code. Our preliminary results indicate that our heuristic suc-
cessfully explores the new or affected code more intensively than
existing techniques and shows that interactive symbolic execution
is a promising technique to advance the state of the art in search
heuristics.
In spite of all of these efforts, some bugs are bound to remain in
the software when it is deployed, and will be discovered and reported
only later by the users. With the last component of Mirage, we
consider the problem of instrumenting programs to reproduce bugs
effectively, while keeping user data private. In particular, we focus
on the tradeoff between the instrumentation overhead experienced
by the user and the time it takes the developer to reproduce a bug
in the program.
Specifically, we propose to use static analysis (dataflow and points-
to analysis) and/or dynamic analysis (time-constrained symbolic ex-
ecution) to find the branches that depend on input. Our instrumen-
tation methods log only those branches to limit the instrumentation
overhead. When a user encounters a bug, the developer uses the
partial branch log to drive a symbolic execution engine to efficiently
reproduce the bug.
Our results show that the instrumentation method that com-
bines static and dynamic analyses strikes the best compromise be-
tween instrumentation overhead and bug reproduction time. For
the programs we consider, this combined method reduces the in-
strumentation overhead by up to 92% (compared to using static
analysis only), while limiting the bug reproduction time (compared
to using dynamic analysis only).
We conclude that our characterization of this tradeoff and our
combined instrumentation method represent important steps in im-
proving bug reporting and optimizing symbolic execution for bug
reproduction.
By combining up-front testing, staged deployment, testing on
user machines, and efficient reporting, Mirage successfully reduces
the number of problems, minimizes the number of users affected,
and shortens the time needed to fix remaining problems.
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Survey about software upgrades and associated problems
In the scope of our research project, we have designed this survey about software upgrades. It is aimed at understanding the 
software upgrading process as well as collecting testimonies about most common issues.
Please note that our research project is a joint effort from two different laboratories at EPFL (http://labos.epfl.ch and 
http://nsl.epfl.ch in Switzerland). The project is not affiliated with or sponsored by any commercial organization. The results of our
survey will be used to evaluate a new infrastructure aimed at improving software deployment and testing. We will share the survey
results with the practitioner and research communities through scientific papers.
In order to recognize your effort in providing the testimony, we will hold a lottery to select four winners who will each receive a 
$50 (50 american dollars) amazon.com gift certificate.
It should not take you more than 10 to 15 minutes to complete the survey. We thank you very much for your participation !
If you have problems with this form, please send us an email at olivier.crameri@epfl.ch
[more information...] * mandatory field
* What is your 
experience in 
performing system 
administration ?
0-1 yr  
2-5 yr  
5-10 yr  
> 10 yr  
* What is your level 
of responsibility as 
a system 
administrator ?
I run the system alone  
I run the system and a few people help me  
I along with few others are the main people in-charge  
I assist other senior administrators, and manage in their 
absence 
 
Other, please explain
* How many 
machines are you 
responsible for ?
less than 10  
10 to 20  
20 to 50  
more than 50  
* What best describes 
the types of 
machines you are 
administering ?
Only desktop systems  
Desktops and servers  
Only servers  
Other, please explain:
* Which operating 
systems are you 
administering ?
Windows on desktops (XP, 2000,...)  
Windows server  
Linux  
FreeBSD  
Mac OS X  
HP-UX  
AIX  
Solaris  
IBM i5/OS (OS/400)  
Other, please specify:
The rest of the survey is about software upgrades. By software upgrade, we mean acquiring a new version of an application, an improved software
module or component, or simply a ”patch” to fix a bug, and integrating it into the system.
* How frequently do 
you install a 
software upgrade ?
More than once a week  
Once a week  
Once every couple of weeks  
Once a month  
Once per quarter  
Once per semester  
Once a year  
Not even once a year  
* Do you use any 
software (e.g. 
package 
management 
system or OS-built 
in upgrade system) 
to install your 
upgrades ?
No  
Yes, please specify which one:  
* Please rank what 
are the most 
important reasons 
to apply an upgrade
insert a value from 1
(most important) to 5 
(least important) for 
each item
Bug fix  
Security fix  
New feature  
User requet  
Other(s)  
* Do you have a 
strategy to test 
upgrades before 
applying them ?
No  
Yes, please explain:
* In general, did you 
encounter problems 
with software 
upgrades ?
No, in general it works out of the box  
No, thanks to the strategy I use to test software upgrades  
Yes, but I usually manage to fix them quickly  
Yes, and sometimes it is catastrophic  
If none of the answer above apply to you, please explain:
* In your opinion, 
what is the 
percentage of 
upgrades that cause 
problems ?
(Please enter a
number between 1 
and 100. For instance 
1% => 1 upgrade 
problem for every 
100 problem-free 
upgrades).
 
* Do you ever refrain 
from installing an 
upgrade because 
you expect problems 
?
No  
Yes. In this case, please explain when/how you decide that 
it is safe to upgrade:
The rest of this survey assumes that you've had problems with software upgrade in the past. If it is not the case, you can jump to the end of the 
survey. If, however, you've had problems, we would highly appreciate if you could provide us with as many details as possible by answering the
following questions. 
We would like to draw your attention to the fact that this is the most important part of the study for us. Describing accurately examples of upgrade 
problems is what will allow us to reproduce and understand them in order to make progress with our prototype
Please specify and rank
Do you have one or 
more examples of 
software upgrade(s) 
that caused 
problem(s) ?
We're interested here
in consequences of 
applying the upgrade 
itself, i.e. problems 
that happen AFTER 
the upgrade has been 
successfully installed. 
We're not interested 
here in problems 
happening during the 
installation (such as 
package conflicts, 
dependency hell and 
so on and so forth...)
Please describe as 
many examples as 
you can think of in 
the following four 
boxes.
Please describe the consequence of the problem(s)  
Please tell us with which software(s) you had the 
problem(s). Please include version number(s)
 
And on what OS(s)/distribution(s) and kernel(s) were they 
?
 
What solution(s) did you find to fix the problems ?  
When you do 
encounter an 
upgrade problem, 
how often do you 
report it back to the 
distributor/vendor ?
Every time  
Most of the time  
Rarely  
Never  
When you do report 
back a problem to 
the 
distributor/vendor, 
what type of 
information do you 
usually send ?
 
If one produced 
software that 
automatically tested 
upgrades on their 
local machines 
with good accuracy 
(i.e. good upgrades 
pass the automatic 
testing whereas bad 
upgrades fail it), 
would you install 
and use it ?
Yes  
No, why ?
Please rank what 
you think are the 
most common 
causes for problems 
in software 
upgrades:
insert a value from 1
(most important) to 5
(least important)
The upgrade is simply buggy  
Important feature/behavior was removed/altered  
Legacy issue (such as deprecated api, 
misuse of api,...)
Broken dependency (i.e. installing the upgrade 
cause problem with a 
dependent software)
Packaging issue (i.e. the upgrade itself is 
"bugfree" except for the 
packaging)
Other(s)  
Out of 100 
problematic 
upgrades, could you 
please estimate 
how many of them 
are causing 
problems during 
installation ?
(this is by opposition
to the number of 
upgrades that cause 
problem AFTER 
installation, i.e. the 
ones that are difficult 
to install because of 
conflicts, missing 
dependency, version 
mismatch,...)
 
Please explain and rank
* Please insert your 
email address
We will use the email
address to contact 
you if we need 
additional information 
and if you win the 
lottery. We won't 
share your email 
address with any 
third party.
 
Send
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